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INTRODUCTION

I. QUA SI-LIBE RTA RIANISM AND THE

PROBLEM OF CONSENT

If there is consent, a rape is no longer a rape, but lovemaking; a theft is
no longer a theft, but a gift; a battery is no longer a battery, but surgery, or
sports, or massage. A wrong, it seems, is no longer a wrong if the victim
consents to it. That at least is the generally accepted view.
To be sure, there are some well-recognized exceptions. Consent does not
count if coercion or deception is involved, if one of the consenting parties
lacked competence, if there are good paternalistic reasons for overriding it
(as there may be with drug use or euthanasia), or if what the parties are
agreeing to would injure some third party (in which case we tend to call it a
conspiracy). Consent might also be questioned if it involves selling some
thing we think should not. be commodified (like sex, bodily organs, or the
services of a birth surrogate), or if it somehow arises out of an egregious
inequality of bargaining power. B ut outside these by now fairly intuitive
special circumstances, the generally accepted view is that consent should be
honored. It is a view that is not fundamentally different from classic liber
tarianism, and so I will refer to it as Quasi-Libertarianism.
The Quasi-Libertarian view seems hard to resist. Other than the listed
exceptions, there seem no good reasons left for not giving effect to some
one's consent. My aim will be to expose such reasons-to show that the
Quasi-Libertarian picture of consent is highly inaccurate, that it misses an
important cluster of reasons for invalidating consent, reasons that often
1
move courts but have never yet been properly articulated.
There is, as it turns out, a wide range of circumstances in which none of
the familiar reasons for invalidating consent applies but in which one is
rightly suspicious of consent and may well want to disregard it. Indeed in
some such cases, often remarkably mundane ones, the suspicion is so
deep-seated that even the most dyed-in-the-wool libertarians will blithely
disregard consent without ever realizing what they are doing. In yet others,
j udges and scholars have realized that something is amiss, that there is
something problematic about consent that is elusive and hard to identify.
Typically judges have dealt with their unease by straining to assimilate
such cases to the familiar exceptions.
The best example of such cases may be consent to risky activities-the
"assumption of risk." Assumption of risk is frequently disregarded either
I.
Each of these recognized exceptions is of course a hornet's nest of difficult and unresolved issues. Among important recent explorations of these are: JoEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS
WRONGDOING ( 1 988); JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS ( 1 984); BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRES
SIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ-FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT
( 1 998); MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES ( 1 996); STEPHEN SCHULHOFER, UN
WANTED SEX ( 1 998); DETLEV STERNBERG-LIEBEN, DIE 0BJEKTIVEN SCHRANKEN DER
EINWILLIGUNG IM STRAFRECHT ( 1 997); ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS
(2003); ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION ( 1 996); ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION ( 1 987); PETER
WESTEN, THE LoGic OF CONSENT (2004). I believe, however, that implicit in all of these different
accounts, indeed to varying degrees explicit, is a picture of the overall geography of consent like the
one I have drawn.
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because the risk-assuming party supposedly did not have a free choice,
enough information, or the necessary competence, or because some vague
and diffuse blend of concerns having to do with paternalism, commodifica
tion, or third-party effects supposedly requires it, although none of these in
2
fact seems to really explain our discomfort with consent in such cases. In
addition, there are many other categories of cases in which a similarly hard
to-persuasively-explain discomfort with consent surfaces: it does so in our
ambivalence toward victimless crimes (like drug use, prostitution, or as
sisted suicide even when engaged in by highly sophisticated, indisputably
4
3
competent parties), our unease with tradeable pollution permits, our refusal
to issue injunctions to enforce personal service contracts, and our bad con
science about the prevalence of plea bargains (and among some even about
5
settlements). It also manifests itself in a range of peculiar but little noticed
ways in which some of the core doctrines of the criminal and tort law over
ride the wishes of all concerned parties.
How is one to explain these kinds of cases? How can one make sense of
situations in which consent seems to fail but not on account of any of the
usual suspects-coercion, deception, incompetence, etc. ? That is the ques
tion this article seeks to answer. The gist of the answer I shall provide is that
what lies behind our discomfort with consent in these cases has to do with
cycling. More precisely, the argument is that without limitations on consent,
familiar criminal law and tort law doctrines are going to get us entangled in
inconsistency-producing cycles, and while there are various ways of break
ing those cycles, one of the least bothersome ways of doing so will turn out
6
to be limitations on consent.
One's first reaction on learning that combining certain legal doctrines
with consent leads to cycling is to think, "Well, so much the worse for
those doctrines ! They must be too rigid. They should probably be
changed." But as we will see, the doctrines in question rest on such basic

2. See Kenneth W. Simons, Assumption of Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory
of Full Preference, 67 B.U. L. REV. 2 1 3 ( 1 987) [hereinafter Simons, Full Preference]; Kenneth W.
Simons, Reflections on Assumption of Risk, 50 UCLA L. REV. 48 1 (2002).
3. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING ( 1 988); DOUGLAS HUSAK, DRUGS
AND RIGHTS ( 1 992).
4.

Robert E. Goodin, Selling Environmental Indulgences, 47 KYKLOS 573 ( 1 994).

5 . O n settlements and plea bargains, see Albert Alschuler, The Changing Pleabargaining
Debate, 69 CAL. L. REv. 652 ( 1 982); Jules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice in Settlements, 4 Soc.
PHIL. & PoL'Y 1 03 ( 1 986); Owen Fiss, Against Settlements, 93 YALE L.J. 1 073 ( 1 984). Discomfort
with consent also surfaces outside the strictly legal domain. For the most notable examples, see Alan
Gibbard, A Pareto-Consistent Libertarian Claim, 7 J. EcoN. THEORY 366 ( 1 974); Amartya Sen, The
Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. PoL. EcoN. 1 52 ( 1 970) (to be discussed later in this arti
cle); see also JoHN BROOME, WEIGHING GOODS ( 1 99 1 ); 2 FRANCES KAMM, MORALITY, MORTALITY
290-3 1 0 ( 1 993). I made exploratory stabs in this direction in Responsibility and Consent: The Lib
ertarian's Problems with Freedom of Contract, 1 6 Soc. PHIL. & PoL'Y 94 ( 1 999), and first made
mention of the triage example at the heart of this piece in ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACK
MAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PuzZLES OF THE LAW 1 80 ( 1 996) [hereinafter KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN
GAINS].
6. For an exceptionally user-friendly introduction to the social choice literature dealing with
cycling, see PAULE. JOHNSON, SOCIAL CHOICE: THEORY AND RESEARCH ( 1 998).
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and impossible-to-give-up ethical commitments (shared by nearly everyone
whether they consider themselves libertarian, communitarian, Rawlsian,
welfare economists, democratic socialists, utilitarians, or whatever else) that
this way out will look exceedingly unattractive-less attractive even than
disregarding the unanimous consent of all concerned parties.
My aim in this Article is explanatory, not normative. It is to show what it
is about the criminal and tort law, and cognate doctrines elsewhere in the
law, that leads them to limit the role of subjective preferences and consent,
and how this in turn allows us to understand a variety of familiar and unfa
miliar oddities not just in criminal and tort law but elsewhere. Even though
my point is an analytical one, it does, however, have normative implications.
After all, if one thinks that the ethical presuppositions on which an area of
law is built are the right ones, then one is going to think the resulting limita
tions on consent a good thing. And since many other areas of law are built
on similar presuppositions, similar limitations might commend themselves
for those other areas as well. Indeed, I think what I have to say might shed
some light on the longstanding controversy about unconscionable contracts
and related conundrums of private law more generally. But that is not some
thing I will pursue here.
A normative subject that I will pursue here are the implications my
analysis has for the debate currently raging over the proper role of welfare
economics in legal policymaking, the debate sparked by Lewis Kaplow's
7
and Stephen Shavell's recent book, Fairness versus Welfare. Any analysis
that casts doubt on the validity of consent, as mine does, also casts doubt on
one of the welfare economist's most treasured assumptions-the Pareto
principle. If we have reason to think that a transaction that all concerned
parties would like to enter into should nevertheless be prohibited, then we
are implicitly rejecting the Pareto principle, which says that anything that
makes some people better off and no one worse off ought to be done. The
authors of Fairness versus Welfare insist that the Pareto principle should be
the lynchpin of all legal analysis and that all fairness-based legal theories
should be cast aside because they one and all violate the Pareto principle.
Later in this essay I will have occasion to tackle their thesis head on.
The way in which I will try to demonstrate my solution to the problem
of the "hidden limitations of consent" is somewhat roundabout. I will begin,
in Part II of this essay, by examining the problem in a very special, highly
artificial context, involving triage decisions in an emergency room. I will
show how in this very unusual context cycling can account for an otherwise
hard-to-explain disregard of the subjective preferences and the consent of
the affected parties. I will then, in Part III of this Article, apply the lessons
of Part II to explain why consent fails in four familiar legal situations
namely, some of the ones I already mentioned: the rejection of the assump
tion-of-risk defense, the creation of victimless crimes, the refusal to enforce
personal service contracts by specific injunction, and the general wariness
toward tradable pollution licenses and analogous means of environmental
7.

LoUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2000).
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control. This list is obviously not exhaustive of all situations in which con
sent inexplicably fails, but it is a fair sample from which the reader may
then extrapolate. Finally, in Part IV, I will look at the way my thesis affects
the newly ignited debate about the relationship of welfare economics and
the law.
II. A SPECIAL INSTANCE OF THE PROBLEM AND OF ITS SOLUTION
A. A Case of Triage
I will begin my exploration of the hidden limitations on consent by con
sidering a case of triage in an emergency room. This must seem like a
strange place to start. Although a wrong triage decision by a doctor might
conceivably, under the right circumstances, qualify as a crime or a tort, it
usually will not. My reason for considering it nevertheless is that it serves to
bring out with exceptional clarity certain features that are buried well be
neath the surface of more quintessentially "legal" cases. What I propose to
do is to look at more traditional criminal and tort law problems through the
lens of this triage example. 8
Dudley is an actor who likes to play the piano. Although piano playing
is not crucial for his professional success, it is a great passion with him. One
day Dudley is involved in an accident. He is basically uninj ured except for
some slight damage to one of his pinkies. Being such a passionate pianist,
Dudley is worried about even the slightest impairment of his manual dexter
ity. He therefore decides to seek out the nearest emergency room to have his
pinkie taken care of. There is exactly one doctor on duty but luckily no other
patient competing for his attention. Dudley's pinkie is about to get the
promptest attention-until very suddenly, another patient is wheeled into the
ER. This patient, let us call her Silvia, has a much more serious injury: her
leg has been badly mangled and, unless she is immediately attended to, she
might well permanently lose the use of that leg. Needless to say, the doctor
immediately decides to redirect his attention from Dudley to Silvia.
I take it no one would want to quarrel with the doctor's decision
except maybe Dudley, but not for any good reason. Or am I perhaps wrong
about that? What if Dudley were to argue as follows: "I happen to know that
Silvia is a perennially depressed poet. Whether her life is going well or
poorly, she is depressed. If she loses her leg, she will be miserable. But she
would be miserable anyway. Indeed one of these days I ' m convinced she
will commit suicide. To me, however, the ability to play the piano makes all
the difference in the world. If I lose even an iota of my manual dexterity and
my piano playing deteriorates as a result, I too will be miserable. But I
would not be otherwise ! You would therefore do more for human happiness
by first attending to my needs rather than hers." This argument would not of
course persuade. But the fact that it would not persuade is something worth
noticing. It means that the doctor is not supposed to give priority to the
8.

I first made mention of this example in KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS, supra note 5 .
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happy pianist over the unhappy poet despite the fact that doing so would
9
maximize overall contentment. The poet's claim to the doctor's services
trumps the pianist's claim, despite the fact that she stands to benefit far less
in terms of happiness than the pianist. A claim to be protected against the
loss of a leg is judged by us to be stronger than a claim to be protected
against the possible slight loss of some dexterity in one's pinkie. The
strength of that claim appears not to depend on the amount of happiness
produced by its fulfillment.
Now let's continue to unfold the story. Just as the doctor is about to look
after Silvia's leg, something peculiar happens. Dudley discovers that he has
actually suffered more of an injury during the accident than he noticed at
first. In addition to the damage to his pinkie, there was also some harm to
his legs. Indeed, it is just now becoming clear that unless his legs are imme
diately looked after, he stands to lose the use of both of them. He brings this
to the attention of the doctor. The doctor readily acknowledges that a two
leg injury trumps a one-leg injury and that, in light of this new development,
Dudley regains his priority over Silvia. But as the doctor is about to start
treating Dudley's leg injuries, Dudley tells him that he would rather the doc
tor first dealt with his pinkie. Dudley explains that his hands are more
important to him than his legs because they are so crucial to his piano play
ing. If having his pinkie treated means he might possibly lose the use of his
legs, he says, "so be it."
What should the doctor do? It seems hard to resist the idea that he
should acquiesce in Dudley's request. After all, it 's Dudley 's body! If Dud
ley prefers to have his pinkie treated rather than his legs, is that not his
business? No one is harmed if the doctor so acts, except perhaps Dudley,
who does not think he would be harmed, and therefore, if we credit Dud
ley's subjective preferences, really is not.
On seeing the doctor start to treat Dudley's pinkie, however, Silvia regis
ters a protest. "How can you give his pinkie priority over my legs? I
understand that his two legs have priority over my one leg, but his pinkie
does not. The fact that he also has a two-leg injury that trumps my one-leg
injury just seems irrelevant as long as he is not having it treated." To under
score her point, Silvia then offers an analogy. "Imagine the following.
Suppose that what the pianist really wanted was neither to have his legs nor
his pinkie treated but just to play a game of checkers with you-that's right,
a game of checkers, with you, the only doctor on duty!-from which treat
ing my leg injury would take you away. He says to you that if you don't play
checkers with him, he is going to insist on your treating his legs, but one
way or another, you are not going to get to treat my leg. Would that lead you
to play checkers with him and thus not treat anyone at all? Isn't the pinkie in
this case pretty much the equivalent of a game of checkers?"
Silvia surely has a point. It does seem strange to give the pinkie priority
over something as serious as the possibility of losing a leg altogether,
9. That is, even if we accept Dudley's controversial assumption about the possibility of
making interpersonal utility comparisons, the utility argument would not persuade.
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regardless of the presence of that untreated two-leg injury. And even if the
strangeness of doing so does not immediately seem apparent, it certainly
should once we consider the absurdity that Siliva's analogy involving the
game of checkers reveals.
This is the "triage cycle" (sometimes I call it the "Original Triage Cy
cle," in contrast to some others later on) around which the rest of this article
is built. The doctor has seemingly compelling grounds for giving Dudley's
two-leg injury priority over Silvia's one-leg injury. He also has seemingly
compelling grounds for respecting Dudley's desire to have his pinkie treated
ahead of his legs. And he has seemingly compelling grounds for treating
Silvia's one-leg injury ahead of Dudley's pinkie. But which is it to be? We
are in a cycle. How do we break it?
B. The Components of the Cycle Reconsidered
One of the steps in this cycle has to be rejected. At least one of the three
priorities argued for has to yield: either the two-leg injury should not win
out over the one-leg injury, or the pinkie should not win out over the two-leg
injury, or the one-leg injury should not win out over the pinkie. But which of
these three priorities is in fact the least compelling?
It will help to give each of the three steps in cycles of this sort a name.
Let us call the first step, by which we grant the pianist's two-leg injury pri
ority over the poet's one-leg injury, the Basic Priority Argument. This is the
step in the cycle that seems hardest to quarrel with. A two-leg injury is more
serious and hence more deserving of treatment than a one-leg injury, and
thus the priority of a two-leg injury over a one-leg injury seems like a very
10
basic one.

10.
Some readers have wondered whether in making the judgment that a two-leg injury is
worse than a one-leg injury I am not simply smuggling in some kind of objective welfare judgment.
Why is it, they ask, that I automatically assume that Dudley's two-leg injury is more serious than
Silvia's one-leg injury when it seems logically quite possible that Silvia derives more utility from
her one leg than Dudley does from two? It must be, they say, because I think that any two-leg injury
is "objectively" worse than a one-leg injury, regardless of how the victim judges the matter. But if I
am relying on objective welfare judgments, they imply, then it is unremarkable that in intermixing
such objective welfare judgments with subjective welfare judgments (like Dudley's ranking his
pinkie above his two legs), we should end up in a cycle.
I am not, however, relying on any objective welfare judgments here. I do not assume anything
about the comparative welfare of Silvia and Dudley when I assert that he has more of a claim to help
with his two-leg injury than she does to help with her one-leg injury. There is no particular connec
tion between claims and welfare. Talking about claims is not just a roundabout way of talking about
welfare. To see this more clearly, note that it will often happen that Person A has a stronger claim to
something than Person B, but B would derive greater welfare from it (whether assessed objectively
or subjectively) than A. The simplest example of this are claims to property. Obviously, Person A
may have a stronger claim to a piece of property than Person B by virtue of the way in which he
acquired it (perhaps it is the fruit of his own labor), despite the fact that it would do more for B 's
welfare if he were to own it instead of A. In a later section in which I discuss the logic of claims
more extensively, I will offer other examples of how comparing the strength of claims has little to do
with comparing welfare or utility.
It is an important feature of my argument that I am not relying on any ideas about objective
welfare, since many people find such ideas eminently resistible. What I say about claims, by con
trast, seems much harder to resist.

634

Michigan Law Review

[Vol . 1 04:627

We will call the next step in the cycle the Pareto Argument. This is Dud
ley's argument that since he prefers to have his pinkie treated rather than his
two legs and since Silvia is in no way harmed thereby, the doctor should
redirect his attention to the pinkie. In slightly more colloquial terms, Dudley
is saying: "What's it to Silvia whether I have my legs or my pinkie treated?
Silvia is not going to get her leg treated either way. If I can't get my pinkie
treated, I will simply insist on having my legs treated. And what would Sil
via get out of that?" In more technical terms, he is arguing that treating the
pinkie rather than the two legs is the Pareto-optimal thing to do. Many peo
ple, probably most, will find the Pareto Argument irresistible. How could
one possibly object to something that benefits one person and does no harm
''
to another?
The final step in the cycle is the one by which Silvia hopes to regain her
priority. This is Silvia's argument that it is outrageous for Dudley's pinkie to
be treated ahead of her leg. Let us call this the Regained Priority Argument.
The objection most people would raise to the Regained Priority Argument
would probably be something like this: "Dudley has a rightful claim to have
his two-leg injury treated ahead of Silvia's one-leg injury. He has chosen to
give up that rightful claim for another claim, namely to have his pinkie
treated instead. That surely is his prerogative. But then there is nothing
really unfair about giving his pinkie priority over Silvia's leg, even though,
looked at superficially, it seems callous."
On reflection this way of dismissing the Regained Priority Argument
starts to look less and less persuasive. What is being overlooked is a vital
conceptual distinction that is both crucial and easily missed. The distinction
is one that has only recently attracted the attention of moral philosophers
and economists and whose full ramifications for a wide variety of issues are
still being worked out. It is the distinction between claims and desires, or as
it is sometimes put, between interests and preferences. Once that distinction
is fully digested, it becomes much harder to reject Silvia's Regained Priority
Argument. Let us see why.
The idea behind the distinction and its connection with our cycle are
best conveyed with an example. Suppose a friend asks you for financial help
with a dental treatment he cannot afford. You might be perfectly willing to
help him out. But suppose that after you have given him this assurance, he
tells you he would much rather use the money you offered him to do some
thing else instead, which he thinks will make him happier-say, go on a
cruise-and forget about the dental treatment. My guess is that you would
balk and rescind your offer of help. But just exactly why are you balking? Is
it because you think it frivolous to spend money on a cruise? That can't be
the reason, since you would balk similarly if he had asked to devote the
money not to a cruise but to his church's charity. Perhaps you are balking
because you think he will regret going on the cruise when he comes back
and is still stuck with his bad teeth. That can't be the reason either, since you
would balk similarly if he spent the money on something durable, like a
1 1.

See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 7, 54-56.
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gold watch, and never regretted the tradeoff. Are you perhaps balking be
cause you do not really believe that he will get more pleasure from a cruise
than from improved teeth? But you might well believe him and still not feel
impelled to finance his cruise. In all likelihood, you are balking quite simply
because you feel morally somewhat obliged to help with dental treatment
but much less so with regard to a cruise. You feel that your friend has a
strong moral claim on you with regard to dental treatment but that he has a
much weaker moral claim with regard to a cruise, despite the fact that his
desire for dental treatment is much weaker than his desire for a cruise. 12 This
illustrates an interesting property of claims and desires: the fact that your
friend has a claim to something you could give him on the one hand and a
strong desire for something else you could give him on the other does not
give him a strong claim to that other thing as well. Exactly why that is so, I
will have a bit more to say about shortly, but that it is the case should seem
reasonably intuitive.
We are now able to see the real strength in Silvia's argument that she re
gains her priority over Dudley when he redirects the doctor's attention from
his legs to his pinkie. Silvia is saying that even though Dudley's claim to
getting his legs treated is stronger than Silvia's to getting her one leg treated
and even though Dudley would much prefer to have his pinkie treated in
stead, it does not follow that his claim to getting his pinkie treated is
stronger than her claim to getting her leg treated. Dudley's claim to getting
his two legs treated is like your friend's claim to getting his dental problem
treated. Just as your friend cannot transmute his claim for help with a dental
treatment into a claim for help with a cruise, Dudley cannot transmute his
claim for help with his two-leg injury into a claim for help with his pinkie.
If Silvia is right, then the step in the cycle that ought to be rejected is the
second one-the Pareto Argument. Despite the fact that treating Dudley's
pinkie makes him better off without making Silvia worse off, the doctor
ought not to treat Dudley's pinkie. But is Silvia right? We will turn to this in
the next Section.
C. A Closer Look at the Pareto Argument
In the previous Section we saw one argument against the Pareto Argu
ment, namely that it is a characteristic feature of claims that they don't
conform to the Pareto principle. Or to put the matter a little more elabo
rately: when comparing Silvia's claim to restoring her leg with Dudley's
claims to restoring his two legs or his pinkie, we saw that such a comparison
does not depend on the happiness each derives from the use of those organs.
In other words, their claim to treatment does not depend on the intensity of
their desire for such treatment. That is how it is with claims generally. A
strong desire for something does not necessarily imply a strong claim to it.

1 2. Some people might find this example more convincing if what your friend wanted to do
was not something as frivolous sounding as a cruise but something more "heroic," like climbing
Mount Kilimanjaro.
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Unavoidably implicit in this disregard of desire is our disregard for Dudley's
13
comparative preference between his legs and his pinkie.
Yet another argument Silvia might make has to do with timing. She
might say: "Suppose that I had only been brought into the ER after Dudley
had already passed up the chance to get his legs treated and was having his
pinkie treated instead. Surely the doctor should switch from treating Dud
ley's pinkie to attending to my one-leg wound instead. Now notice that at
this point Dudley is no longer in a position to stop the doctor by saying that
if he does not continue to treat his pinkie, then Dudley would insist that the
doctor treat his two-leg injury. But do we really think that whether Dudley
gets his pinkie treated or not should tum on whether at the moment at which
I am delivered to the ER, the treatment of his two-leg injury is still a live
possibility?"
Finally, there is a third argument that Silvia can make against letting
Dudley have his way. This is in some ways the strongest argument against
the Pareto Argument and in favor of the Regained Priority Argument. It in
volves constructing a more elaborate cycle than the one we have dealt with
so far, one in which each of the steps is even more obviously compelling
than the Regained Priority Argument, and in which it is therefore even
harder to do anything other than reject the Pareto step of the cycle.
I am going to construct this cycle with the help of the so-called "neces
sity defense," the doctrine whereby someone is justified in committing a
crime, provided there are sufficiently compelling circumstances. One exam
ple would be if the crime is a comparatively minor one and the reason for
14
committing it has to do with saving lives. A fairly standard instance of this
is the stranded hiker who breaks into a cabin because that is his only way of
avoiding certain starvation. Consider, then, the following variation of the
standard necessity case: Two friends, Doc and Dudley, are mountain climb
ing when they run out of food and water. Doc is clearly strong enough to
make it back off the mountain, but Dudley, much weaker than Doc, might
not make it. Luckily they come across an apparently well-stocked mountain
cabin, which, as it happens, belongs to someone named Silvia. Doc is about
to break into the cabin in search of supplies. Just before he does, Dudley
says to him: "Given all the effort we have already invested in this, I would
be loath to tum back before we have reached the top. Let's just take what we

13.
Some readers might find the following variation on the foregoing argument illuminating.
The doctor might reason to himself as follows: "What is the cost of not acceding to Silvia's claim to
have her one-leg injury treated? Is it that I cannot treat Dudley's two-leg injury, or is that I cannot
treat Dudley's pinkie? It cannot be both, since I could not possibly treat both. Well, let us say, I
regard the inability to treat the one-leg injury as the cost of treating the pinkie. Then I clearly should
go ahead and treat the one-leg injury, since Silvia's claim to her leg is stronger than Dudley's claim
to his pinkie. Now let me try the alternative supposition on for size. Let me suppose that I regard the
inability to treat Dudley's two-leg injury as the cost of treating Silvia's one-leg injury. Then, of
course, I should decline to treat the one-leg injury, since Dudley's claim is clearly superior to Sil
via's. But in that case what I ought to do is to treat the two-leg injury. If I do not, then why am I
considering it (rather than the pinkie) as the cost of treating the one-leg injury? Either way I should
not be treating Dudley's pinkie."
14.

MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.02 ( 1 962)
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find and proceed onward. I'll take my chances on getting back down." Doc
nods in agreement. He then proceeds to break into the cabin and helps him
self to whatever supplies he can find.
We now have another version of the familiar triage cycle. Let us see
why. Doc here faces three possible courses of action.
Alternative (I): He could choose not to break into the cabin and simply try
to get Dudley back down the mountain, hoping for the best.
Alternative (2): He could break into the cabin, get the necessary supplies,
and thus make sure they make it back safely.
Alternative (3): He could break into the cabin, get the supplies, and use
them to continue his climb with Dudley.

Let's consider the choice between (1) and (2). Obviously Doc is permit
ted to choose to break into Silvia's cabin if that is necessary to save
Dudley's life. In other words, it seems clear he is permitted to choose
(2) over (1). That is the idea behind the defense of necessity.
Consider next the choice between (2) and (3). Both Doc and Dudley
would prefer to use the supplies from Silvia's cabin to try to continue their
climb and take their chances on getting safely back down. Since the effect
on Silvia is the same either way and they would prefer this outcome, it
seems they should be free to choose (3) over (2).
Finally, consider the choice between (3) and (1). Silvia will protest that
she can see having her cabin raided for the sake of ensuring a safe return
down the mountain, but not for the sake of continuing a daredevil attempt to
reach the peak. That argues for choosing (1) over (3).
Thus far we have simply recreated the Original Triage Cycle. Breaking
into the cabin corresponds to switching treatment from the poet's one leg to
the pianist's two legs. (It is just another version of the Basic Priority Argu
ment.) Using the proceeds to prolong the hike corresponds to switching
treatment from the pianist's legs to his pinkie. (It is just another version of
the Pareto Argument.) And desisting from breaking into the cabin altogether
corresponds to switching treatment from the pianist's pinkie back to the
poet's one leg. (It is another version of the Regained Priority Argument.) I
would argue that the least bothersome way to resolve the cycle would be to
prohibit the move from (2) to (3), that is, to reject the Pareto Argument. In
other words, we ought not allow the defendant to argue: "I could have
claimed the cabin owner's property so as to get my friend off the mountain;
and I have chosen to exchange that right for the right to use the cabin
owner's property to prolong our climb.''15

1 5. There is one subtle difference between this and the triage cycle that is worth noting,
though it does not change the basic character of the problem: The move from (I) to (2) is obligatory
in the triage context, but merely permissible here. As between treating the poet's one-leg injury and
the pianist's two-leg injury, the doctor is obligated to do the latter. As between not breaking into the
cabin and breaking into the cabin so as to be able to bring his friend down the mountain safely, the
defendant is permitted but not obligated to do the latter, because crimes committed out of necessity
are permissible but not obligatory.
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Now let us complicate the picture a little. Let us suppose there is a sec
ond cabin nearby. It contains the supplies and equipment necessary for
prolonging the climb but will do nothing to enhance Dudley's ability to
make his way back down the mountain. As it happens, breaking into that
second cabin would do considerably less damage than breaking into the first
cabin. What should Doc do? We now get another cycle, more interesting and
illuminating than the Original Triage Cycle. In connection with this cycle, it
is much, much harder than before to resist the inference that Dudley's pref
erences ought to be overridden.
Doc's menu of choices includes the following four alternatives:
Alternative (1): He could choose not to break into any cabin and simply try
to get his friend back down the mountain, hoping for the best.
Alternative (2): He could break into Cabin 1 and use the garnered supplies
to get his friend safely down the mountain.
Alternative (3): He could break into Cabin 1 and use the supplies he finds
to continue the climb.
Alternative (4): He could break into Cabin 2 and continue the climb. If he
did this, he would do less damage than if he broke into Cabin 1. Of course,
the supplies he would find there could only be used to prolong the climb.

Again, let us consider the possible choices in pairs. How should, or
could, Doc choose when deciding between Alternative (1) and Alternative
(2)? The defense of necessity would allow him to break into Cabin 1 if that
is what is necessary to get his friend back down the mountain safely, sug
gesting he is free to choose (2) over (1). This is just the familiar Basic
Priority Argument.
Now consider the choice between Alternative (2) and Alternative (3).
The reasoning is the same as before. Whether he follows Alternative (2) or
(3), Doc is breaking into Silvia's cabin and doing an equal amount of dam
age to her cabin and her supplies. But in Alternative (2), he uses the supplies
to get back home, and in Alternative (3), he uses them to do what both he
and Dudley would prefer, to prolong the climb. Since doing the latter does
no additional harm to Silvia and is preferred by Doc and Dudley, it seems
they should be free to choose (3). It is the Pareto-optimal thing to do. In
other words, this is the just the Pareto Argument.
Consider next Doc's choice between Alternative (3) and Alternative (4),
namely breaking into Cabin 1 or breaking into Cabin 2. This is where things
get interesting. Either cabin would yield him what he and Dudley want, the
supplies necessary to prolong their climb. Cabin 2 is not nearly as useful as
Cabin 1, however, for making an immediate descent back down the moun
tain. Since Cabin 2 involves doing less damage to someone else's property
than Cabin 1 while still providing them with all they want, it seems that Doc
should break into Cabin 2 instead. In other words, he should be required to
choose Alternative (4) over Alternative (3). This is essentially another ver
sion of the Basic Priority Argument.
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Finally, consider Doc's choice between Alternative (4) and Alternative
(1). Should he break into Cabin 2 so as to be able to prolong his climb or not
break into any cabin and simply try to get down the mountain with his
friend? Breaking into Cabin 2 so as to prolong the climb is not what the ne
cessity defense is usually taken to justify. The fact that breaking into Cabin
2 would yield them great utility obviously does not give them any great
claim to do so. Intense desire is not the basis for a valid necessity claim. He
should therefore be required to choose (1) over (4). This too is just another
version of the Basic Priority Argument. Given the choice between breaking
into a cabin so as to prolong a climb and not breaking into it at all, the latter
deserves priority. This gives us yet another cycle.
So how do we break this cycle? Again, I would suggest that the step in
the cycle that we will find most tolerable to give up is that between Alterna
tive (2) and Alternative (3). To give up on that step is to tell Doc that he may
not exchange his right to break into the cabin for the sake of getting down
the mountain, for a right to break into that same cabin to prolong the climb.
To be sure, this seems awkward. It is odd that he cannot do something that
would not hurt Silvia, yet would benefit both him and Dudley. But what
other solution do we have?
What is interesting about this more complicated version of the triage cy
cle is that the need to override Dudley's preferences seems so much more
compelling here. Even those who hesitated in the Original Triage Cycle will
find it very difficult to accept the consequences of not rejecting the Pareto
Argument in this case. If we did not block the move from Alternative (2) to
Alternative (3), we would have to avoid the cycle by blocking one of the
other steps in the cycle. But notice how much more objectionable that would
be. To block the move from Alternative (1) to Alternative (2) (break into
Cabin 1 rather than not break into either cabin), we would have to reject the
defense of necessity. To block the move from alternative (3) to Alternative (4),
we would have to permit Doc to inflict more damage than is necessary to at
tain his objective of prolonging the climb. To block the move from Alternative
(4) to Alternative (1), we would have to allow the defense of necessity to be
invoked whenever someone has a sufficiently intense desire for something.
In other words, we would have to say that if breaking into Cabin 2 is what is
required for Doc and Dudley to fulfill their dream of getting to the top of the
mountain, then they are entitled to do it. We are thus stuck with blocking the
move from Alternative (2) to Alternative (3): Doc may not use what he finds
in Cabin 1 for the purpose of prolonging the climb even though that would
be the Pareto-optimal thing to do.
My purpose in constructing this more complicated cycle was to create
an example in which the most controversial step in the Original Triage Cy
cle, the Regained Priority Argument, is replaced by two much less
controversial steps, the two new versions of the Basic Priority Argument, the
moves from (3) to (4) and from (4) to (1). Because these Basic Priority Ar
guments are so much harder to resist than the Regained Priority Argument,
the case for rejecting the Pareto Argument has grown that much stronger.
Strictly speaking, the fact that the Pareto Argument fails in the context of
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this new cycle does not establish that it also fails in the Original Triage Cy
cle, but it certainly makes that possibility much harder to resist.
D. Implications for Consent
What we have seen thus far is that in the context of my highly artificial
Original Triage Cycle (and its close cousin, the "necessity cycle"), we can
most plausibly avoid a cycling problem by giving up on the Pareto Argu
ment. I have not said anything so far about consent, but it should not be
surprising that a rejection of the Pareto Argument should have some imme
diate implications for consent. What are those implications?
To begin with, note that by rejecting the Pareto Argument in the Original
Triage Cycle-by not allowing Dudley to get his pinkie treated instead of
his legs-we are invalidating someone's consent under circumstances in
which none of the usual reasons for invalidating consent applies. There is no
force or fraud involved; there is nothing that impairs Dudley's ability to
competently decide; there are no third-party effects; he is not selling any
thing uncommodifiable, etc. Nevertheless, we treat his right to have his legs
treated as inalienable: we do not allow him to alienate it in exchange for
getting his pinkie treated. We have here, then, a first counterexample to the
Quasi-Libertarian view of consent, namely a situation in which none of the
usual reasons for invalidating consent is present but in which we are none
theless strongly inclined to find consent invalid.
But the Original Triage Cycle harbors within it another counterexample
to the Quasi-Libertarian view, one that will help us see how a rejection of
the Pareto Argument in the Original Triage Cycle is going to lead to the in
validation of consent more generally. Let us suppose that Dudley were to
ask Silvia for her permission to get his pinkie rather than his legs treated,
perhaps by promising her some money in return. If Silvia consented, would
her consent be effective? According to the Quasi-Libertarian view, it ought
to be, since there was no force, no fraud, nor any other generally accepted
consent-impairing feature present. Nevertheless, we shall see that in contra
diction to the Quasi-Libertarian, such consent would probably not be
effective; or rather, that if we were to deem it effective, we would then be
stuck with all kinds of unpalatable implications. Let us see why.
When we ask whether consent is effective, we usually just have in mind
whether the consenting party will be entitled to complain despite her con
sent. In other words, can she still sue for damages? For that matter, can the
state still charge the perpetrator with a crime? But there are other, slightly
more indirect and easily overlooked ways in which consent can be effective
or ineffective, and it will be useful to consider those others before we con
sider whether it is effective in the most direct and obvious way, namely by
denying her the right to complain afterwards. What are these indirect and
easily overlooked effects of consent? Broadly speaking, they are the follow
ing: if we were to give full effect to Silvia's consent, it would presumably
mean that she would be successfully transferring to Dudley a variety of
rights and privileges she holds in regard to her legs. More precisely, it would
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mean that Dudley would henceforth be able to claim for the sake of his
pinkie all the rights and privileges Silvia used to be able to claim for the
sake of her leg. But is that in fact what will happen as a result of Silvia's
consent? Let me list a few rights and privileges that quite clearly will not
have been successfully transferred from Silvia to Dudley.
First, Silvia's consent will not have the effect of alienating her self-help
rights with respect to her leg. What I mean by that is this: If someone's legs
(or any other part of his body) are threatened with serious injury, he may use
potentially deadly force to defend himself. By contrast, if someone's pinkie
is threatened with an injury that might result in some slight loss in dexterity,
he presumably would not be able to use such force. Now notice that if Sil
via 's consent were fully effective, then the amount offorce that Dudley could
henceforth use to defend his pinkie would be identical to that Silvia previ
16
ously was entitled to use to defend her leg. And yet, quite clearly, he will
not be able to do so. To be sure, he will be able to use some measure of
forcible self-defense to protect his pinkie from an attack. But the amount of
permissible force will be limited to the level we deem appropriate for de
fending a pinkie, as opposed to the level appropriate for defending a leg.
Second, Silvia's consent will not have the effect of alienating her due
care rights with respect to her legs. What are due-care rights? Everybody is
entitled to a certain amount of care, effort, and expenditure from others to
avoid being injured by them. In tum, everyone is entitled to engage in a va
riety of activities that impose some non-zero measure of risk on others, as
long as it is not excessive. Of course, the amount of care that may be ex
pected from others and the amount of risk that may be imposed on others
will vary. They will depend on the stakes. If what is at stake is the loss of a
leg, things will be different than if it is merely a pinkie. Everyone is entitled
to a more substantial effort from others to avoid being subjected to a major
injury than merely to avoid being subjected to a minor injury. In tum, every
one is permitted to impose a much more substantial risk of injury on others
if he needs to do so to avert the major calamity of losing his leg than if he is
merely seeking to avert the more minor mishap of having his pinkie injured.
17
Those are his due-care rights.
Now observe that Silvia is no more able to alienate her due-care rights,
than she is able to alienate her self-help rights. In other words, she cannot by
her consent enable Dudley to claim from others on behalf of his pinkie the
level of precautions she, Silvia, could previously claim on behalf of her leg;
nor can she enable him to impose on others on behalf of his pinkie the level
of risk she herself could previously impose on behalf of her leg.

1 6. Someone might well exclaim: "Well, of course she can't transfer her due-care rights.
After all, other people than she and Dudley have a stake in this, namely the people who will be
imposed upon for the sake of a pinkie rather than a leg." But it hardly seems a matter "of course" if
we imagine that Dudley will i mpose on them for the sake of his pinkie exactly those risks Silvia
would have imposed on them for the sake of her legs. In any event, for our purposes here, all that is
necessary is that we all agree on the bottom line, namely that Silvia's consent will in fact not be
capable of transferring her due-care rights.
1 7.

See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.02(2)(c)-(2)(d) ( 1 962).

Michigan Law Review

642

[Vol. 104:627

Third, Silvia's consent will also not have the effect of alienating her ne
cessity and duress rights with respect to her legs. 18 Both the defense of
necessity and the defense of duress allow a defendant to commit certain
crimes if necessary to avert some other sufficiently great misfortune. The
greater the misfortune being averted, the more serious the crime one may
commit to avert it. If Silvia were faced with a threat to her leg, there would
thus be some serious crimes she would be permitted to commit to avert that
threat. By contrast, if someone is merely faced with the threat of a little
harm to his pinkie, the seriousness of the crime he may commit is signifi
cantly lower.
Now realize that Silvia will be as unsuccessful in conveying her neces
sity and duress rights to Dudley as she is in conveying her self-help rights
and her due-care rights. In other words, she is not able to make it possible
for Dudley to commit all the crimes on behalf of his pinkie that she herself
would have been able to commit on behalf of her leg.
Fourth, Silvia's consent will not have the effect of alienating her com
pensation-related rights with respect to her leg. 19 If Silvia were to seek
compensation from a putative tortfeasor for injuring her leg, she would most
likely be entitled to a larger sum than if Dudley were to seek compensation
for his pinkie injury. This would be true even if Dudley could somehow
demonstrate that he valued his pinkie far more than Silvia valued her leg. In
a related vein, if the injury to the leg were the result of an intentional crime,
and the injury to the pinkie as well, we would view the former as far more
serious than the latter, regardless of how the respective victims feel about
the seriousness of the injury, and we would judge the leg injury to call for
more serious punishment than the pinkie injury. In other words, Silvia's ef
fort to alienate her leg-related claims to Dudley will not succeed in allowing
him to claim for his pinkie, should it ever be injured, what Silvia would
have been able to claim for her leg.
So far we have dodged the most crucial question: what impact does Sil
via's consent have on the liability of the doctor and of Dudley? We have
seen that Silvia's consent will not change Dudley's self-defense rights, his
due-care rights, his necessity and duress rights, and his compensation
related rights. But will it not at least change the situation this much, that the
doctor and the pianist will escape all liability if the treatment they divert
from Silvia is diverted with her consent? The problem with giving Silvia 's
consent such effect is that Silvia really has no stake in what the doctor and
Dudley do amongst themselves. Whether or not Silvia gives her consent, she
will not succeed in having her leg treated. If she refuses her consent, the
doctor will end up treating Dudley's two-leg injury. If she grants her con
sent, he will end up treating Dudley's pinkie. Silvia herself will remain
unaffected. To be sure, if the law were to say that her consent is required for
the doctor to be able to treat Dudley's pinkie, she might be able to extract
1 8.

See id. §§ 2.09, 3.02.

See Gurno CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATIITUDES AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW PER
SPECTIVES ON A Pusuc LAW PROBLEM 45 ( 1985).
19.
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some money from Dudley in exchange for that consent. But that does not
make her different from anyone else on the planet to whom the law might
grant veto power over the doctor's treatment of the pinkie. The question is
whether Silvia should be judged to have some kind of claim to such a veto
power, and given her lack of a stake in the matter, it seems she should not.
To drive this point home-or perhaps to belabor it unnecessarily-it will
be useful once again to think about self-help rights, due-care rights, neces
sity and duress rights, and compensation-related rights, but this time from a
slightly different angle.
One way to more fully appreciate just how little Silvia has at stake is to
ask how aggressive a self-help remedy she would be entitled to use to vindi
cate her stake. It would seem that she would not be able to act very
aggressively at all. Just suppose that the doctor were to proceed to treat
Dudley's pinkie without first having secured Silvia's consent. Would Silvia
be able to use even the slightest degree of force to prevent him from doing
so? Given that one way or another, her own leg will go untreated, it seems
she would not.
This is but one way of seeing the point. Another way of dramatizing the
smallness of Silvia's stake is to inquire into the due-care rights by which it
is protected. Suppose a third party were to engage in some activity that had
the potential of preventing the doctor from treating Dudley's legs and that
would lead to his treating Dudley's pinkie instead. Must that third party
make costly efforts to ensure that such a contingency will not occur? And if
it does occur, will he be found to have injured Silvia and to owe her com
pensation? Conversely, should Silvia be able to impose a significant risk on
others in the course of trying to make sure that the doctor does not treat
Dudley's pinkie rather than his legs? Given that nothing would please
Dudley more than if the doctor were to be prevented from treating his legs
and thus had to treat his pinkie instead and given also that Silvia will not
suffer any adverse consequences if Dudley's pinkie rather than his legs are
treated, one would be reluctant to impose on a third party the obligation to
incur very significant costs to ensure that the pinkie gets treated rather
than the legs.
A third way of driving home the smallness of Silvia's stake is to ask
about the necessity and duress rights by which it is protected. Suppose that
only by committing some serious crime could Silvia ensure that Dudley's
legs, as opposed to his pinkie, are treated. Would she be able to do so? That
is, would she be able to invoke the necessity or duress defense if she did so?
Given that Dudley would prefer to have his pinkie treated and Silvia has
nothing really riding on the matter, one would be reluctant to say she can
commit such crimes.
A fourth way in which the smallness of Silvia's stake manifests itself has
to do with her compensation-related rights. Suppose Dudley and the doctor
decided to ignore Silvia and simply proceeded to a treatment of the pinkie.
Would she be able to claim compensation for this wrong? For that matter,
would she be able to claim that she had suffered a punishable harm by being
deprived of the money they would have had to pay her to secure her
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consent? Given that she would not have received treatment under any cir
cumstaµces, one would be reluctant to recognize such a claim. Put
differently, it is hard to see that Silvia has suffered a compensable or pun
ishable injury when the doctor treats Dudley's pinkie ahead of his legs.
In sum, Silvia's consent would not do Dudley any good. It does not en
able the doctor to go forward and treat Dudley's pinkie. The triage cycle
thus furnishes us with a situation in which all parties even remotely con
cerned (Dudley, Silvia, and the doctor) want a certain transaction to go
forward (namely the treatment of Dudley's pinkie in lieu of his legs) and
have it in their physical power to make it go forward, but nonetheless are not
permitted to despite the absence of force, fraud, or any of the other familiar
consent-impairing conditions.

E. The Essence of the Argument: More on Claims versus Desires
Before turning to the implications my argument has for less artificial
situations than my triage example, it will be useful to pause briefly and ask
just what brought us to the bizarre-sounding conclusion at which we have
arrived.
I have already alluded to what I take to be the root cause of that conclu
sion, the distinction between claims and desires. I am hardly the first to
draw attention to this distinction; nor am I the first to note that it is one that
is likely to be of profound significance and to generate many strange impli
cations. Two philosophers, Thomas Scanlon and Thomas Nagel, are
probably to be credited most with doing so. Strangely enough, however,
neither they nor those following in their footsteps seem to have noticed that
among those strange implications is a dramatic alteration of our familiar,
Quasi-Libertarian picture of consent.
In a famous passage of his book The View From Nowhere, Thomas Na
gel illuminates the distinction between claims and desires in a particularly
striking way, one that, at least in retrospect, carries us right to the threshold
of those implications but then stops just short of drawing them. Nagel ex
plains that if a person has a bad headache, "everyone has a reason to want it
to stop," and anyone who can easily get rid of the person's headache should
20
do so. Nagel continues:
The same may be said of other basic elements of human good or ill.
But many values are not like this. Though some human interests (ar.d
not only pleasure and pain) give rise to impersonal values, . . . not all of
them do . . . . [l]f I badly want to climb to the top of Mount Kilimanjaro,
not everyone has a reason to want me to succeed. I have a reason to try to
get to the top, and it may be much stronger than my reason for wanting a
headache to go away, but other people have very little reason, if any, to
care whether I climb the mountain or not. . . .

20.

THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE, 1 66--67 ( 1 986).
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. . . [even if,] [a]s it happens, [I] may [be quite willing] to put up with
severe altitude headaches and nausea to get to the top of a mountain
21
that high.

You can see within Nagel's example the seeds of something like the
Original Triage Cycle. The Original Triage Cycle in turn contains within it
the seeds of destruction for our conventional Quasi-Libertarian view of con
sent. What remains to be seen is whether any of that matters in situations
less contrived than those contemplated so far.
III. THE AR GUMENT GENERALIZED

Let us, then, take the foregoing analysis and see whether it can be used
to make sense of some cases in which we intuitively feel there is a problem
with consent despite the fact that none of the conventional consent
impairing circumstances is present. As I noted in the introduction, I will
consider four areas in which such cases are particularly common: tradeable
pollution licenses; the assumption-of-risk defense; victimless crimes; and
personal service contracts. I start with tradeable pollution licenses, not be
cause they are the most important of the phenomena I consider, but because
they are the easiest to explain and because they form a natural bridge toward
the other topics.
A. Tradeable Pollution Licenses
For some time now, many economists have touted a system of tradeable
pollution licenses as being a particularly desirable form of environmental
regulation, better than the more traditional "command-and-control"

2 1 . Id. at 1 67. Here, Nagel is echoing an equally famous passage from an article by Thomas
Scanlon, in which he writes: "The fact that someone would be willing to forego a decent diet in
order to build a monument to his god does not mean that his claim on others for aid in his project
has the same strength as a claim for aid in obtaining enough to eat . . . ." T.M. Scanlon, Preference
and Urgency, 72 J. PHIL. 655, 659-60 ( 1 975).
Some readers will be tempted to conclude from Nagel's and Scanlon's examples that when
they speak about claims they are really just making a paternalistic judgment about what someone
ought to desire (if he were only enlightened enough), namely the stuff he really needs. But that is
just an unfortunate feature of the particular way in which Nagel and Scanlon choose to illustrate
their point. In fact, there is nothing paternalistic about the judgment that someone who desires
something intensely has a low claim to it or that someone who desires something only slightly has a
strong claim to it. This becomes very clear when we consider claims that are based on something
other than need.
Consider property claims. Person A may have a strong claim to something, let us say because
he made it himself. Person B, who did not make it, may therefore have very little claim to it, while
at the same time he may have a much stronger desire for it than Person A. When we say in this case
that A has a stronger claim to the thing than B, we are evidently not saying anything paternalistic.
Another example. When Defendant causes harm to Victim A, let us say by not helping him es
cape some harm, like drowning, or by inflicting on him a purely accidental injury, he is infringing
only on a very modest set of A's claims. By contrast, when Defendant causes harm to B by injuring
him intentionally, he is infringing on B's very strong claim. The harm caused to A may be much
greater than the harm caused to B. But A's claim to be free of such harm is nonetheless much weaker
than B 's claim to be free of such harm. Once again it is evident that this judgment about the com
parative strength of claims has nothing to do with paternalism.
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approaches, whereby the government simply mandates specific emission
devices and emission limits for every polluter. The licensing system works
roughly like this: The government decides on a certain tolerable maximum
for emissions of a given type. It then allocates to each manufacturer a li
cense to produce a certain amount of such emissions. Finally, it permits
those licenses to be traded. This is regarded as an especially efficient form
of environmental control because it gives each manufacturer an incentive to
develop the most cost-effective, emission-reducing technologies and be
cause it ensures that those who have the greatest need for such licenses are
able to get them by buying them from others who have less need for them.
Nevertheless, this kind of market-based environmental regulation has its
foes. But the foes have not been able to explain (indeed, seem to not quite
understand) what it is that bothers them about this kind of approach. As one
prominent foe, Robert Goodin, readily acknowledges:
[f]rom an economic point of view, the case for [market-based regulation]
seems well nigh indisputable. Environmental economists are therefore
frankly dumbfounded when such "unassailable" proposals nonetheless
come under attack from fellow environmentalists. The latter, in turn, have
proven particularly inept at articulating exactly what they see wrong with
22
[them]. The exchange amounts to a veritable dialogue of the deaf.

Our analysis of the Original Triage Cycle will enable us to see the real
problem with such tradeable pollution licenses.
Suppose we were to use the same approach to control traffic accidents.
In other words, we first decide on a maximum number of traffic accidents
we can stomach in light of the value we place on driving. Next we calculate
what level of risk-imposition would produce that number of accidents. We
then distribute to each driver a license to produce a certain amount of risk in
a given year, such that the total amount of "authorized" risk will generate
the maximum number of accidents we can live with. Obviously there are
numerous conceptual and technological impediments that would not make
this practicable. But that does not matter for our purposes here. Let us sup
23
pose it could be done. Should it be?
This is where a slightly modified version of the Original Triage Cycle
can help in our analysis. Let us transpose the Original Triage Cycle from the
context of triage into the context of negligent risk creation. Once again, as
sume Dudley has had an accident. Again assume that all he notices at first is
the possibility of an injury to his pinkie. He turns to a friend and asks to be
driven to the next emergency room as quickly as possible. The streets are
congested, and a fast ride through the crowds is going to pose significant
risks to bystanders. Is the friend entitled to thus endanger these bystanders?
If he causes an accident, will he be liable? I am assuming that his speed is
22.

Goodin, supra note 4, at 573-75 (citations omitted).

23. To perfect the analogy, a lot more needs to be added into the example. One needs to
ensure, for instance, that not only the average risk but also the statistical distribution of risk remains
unchanged as a result of the licensing scheme. I don't believe, however, that my analysis would be
affected by those details.
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one that would, under ordinary circumstances, be judged excessive, unwar
ranted, and liability-producing. But these are not ordinary circumstances,
since he is trying to get treatment for Dudley's pinkie. Is that reason
enough? Probably not. The threatened injury to the pinkie would probably
not be judged to be a serious enough matter to warrant imposing any great
risk on the bystanders. But what of the fact that the pinkie is so important to
Dudley? And what if we were to add that the bystanders are all depressed
poets, like Silvia, whose imperturbably miserable state would not be greatly
affected by an injury? The answer presumably would not change, just as it
would not in the Original Triage Cycle.
Now let us add the familiar further wrinkle: Suppose that just after being
rebuffed in his request to his friend to drive faster, Dudley notices the injury
to his two legs. Will he now be allowed to ask his friend to drive faster? Pre
sumably yes. The injury now being more serious, he is of course entitled to
impose greater risk on the bystanders. But what if he says that, although he
is entitled to have his friend drive faster on account of his legs, he would
really like to get his pinkie treated first. Indeed, if a choice had to be made ,
he would sacrifice treatment of his legs for treatment of his pinkie. We
would presumably be just as disinclined to let him insist that his friend im
pose great risks on bystanders for the sake of his pinkie as we were
disinclined to let the ER doctor deprive Silvia's leg of treatment for the sake
of Dudley's pinkie.
Much like Silvia, the bystanders would be able to say to the driver:
"How can you give his pinkie priority over our general safety? Do we not
have a greater claim to general safety than he has to his pinkie?"
To be sure, the driver might reply, as did the doctor, "Ordinarily yes, but
in this case he also had an injury to his legs, which has a greater claim to
being treated than your claim to maintain your physical safety. He decided
to trade in, as it were, that claim to have his legs treated, for the treatment of
his pinkie."
"We don't see why that matters any," the bystanders would again be able
to reply. "Suppose he had told you that he enjoys fast car rides, and that
what he would most like you to do is to drive as fast as you would for his
leg injury, even though he will not in fact have his legs treated, just for the
thrill of it. Would you acquiesce in that? We just don't see how you can give
something as trivial as his concern for his pinkie priority over our more se
rious concerns." The argument seems no less compelling here than in the
original triage case.
We have thus recreated the same cycle as before. The driver is supposed
to give preference to the pianist's legs, because a 100% certain leg injury
counts for more than the mere possibility of a serious injury to the bystand
ers. (The Basic Priority Argument.) He is supposed to give preference to the
pianist's pinkie over his legs because the pianist values his pinkie more than
his legs, or differently put, because that is the Pareto-optimal thing to do.
(The Pareto Argument.) And finally, he is supposed to give preference to the
bystanders' safety over the pianist's pinkie, because one person's claim to a
restored pinkie counts for less than many people's claim to safety from
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serious injury. (The Regained Priority Argument.) Once again, we have a
cycle, and the most appealing way of breaking it would seem to be, just as
before, to cast the subjective preferences of the pianist aside.
Notice that the case for disregarding Dudley's wishes looks, if anything,
stronger in our "negligence cycle" than in the Original Triage Cycle. Dud
ley's arguments that he could have sped to the ER for the sake of his legs
and that he therefore should be allowed to speed there for the sake of
his pinkie sound even more hollow in this context than in the Original
24
Triage Cycle.
We can now see why tradeable licenses make us so uneasy. Once we al
low a license to drive negligently to be traded, then transactions of the type
we just found to be unacceptable in our transposed triage cycle would be
come routine. Every driver would be allocated a license to impose a fixed
amount of risk on people around him and could do so for whatever purpose
he liked, including the saving of a pianist's pinkie. And if he does not have
enough of a license to impose all of the risk he wants to impose, he can buy
what he needs from others. As a conceptual matter, there is no real differ
ence between a license to drive negligently and a license to pollute. And
25
therein lies the problem with tradeable pollution licenses.
B. The Assumption of Risk and Victimless Crimes
One issue that arises repeatedly in criminal and tort law is whether the
victim's consent to risk ought to exonerate the defendant. It arises most
clearly in tort law with regard to the scope of the assumption-of-risk de
fense. It arises in criminal law in connection with risky activities, like drag
26
racing, if one of the participants dies. It also arises at the level of criminal
law policy in so-called victimless crimes when we decide to make some
thing a crime despite the fact that its alleged victim would very much like to
engage in it: prostitution, drug-consumption, drug-selling, gambling, and the
sale of body parts for transplant purposes. Let us see how our analysis can
27
shed light on this.
24.

By contrast, many of the arguments against indulging Dudley's wishes ring even truer.

For instance, the argument about costs and benefits: "What is the cost," we might ask, "of not letting
Dudley speed? It is either that he loses some dexterity in his pinkie or that he loses his legs. It can't
be both, because we are supposing that only one of these can be treated in time. If it is the lost dex
terity of his pinkie that constitutes the cost of not speeding, then surely his claim to a healthy pinkie
is weaker than the bystanders' claim to their own bodily safety. If it is the loss of the legs that consti
tutes the cost, then he must have his legs treated when he arrives at the ER rather than his pinkie.
Either way he cannot have his pinkie treated."

25.
I do not really mean to urge that we abandon tradeable pollution licenses. Rather, I mean
to lay bare the compelling intuitions that lie behind the strong reservations they elicit among many
people, despite the fact that the transfer of such rights does not involve force, fraud, or other recog
nized consent-impairing elements, and despite the fact that it is so much more efficient than the
alternative.

26. See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEVEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES
545-50 (7th ed. 200 1 ).
27.

The problem I am here considering involves what is usually put under the heading of the

"express" and the "primary" assumption of risk, rather than the so-called secondary assumption of
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Let us return to the most recent modification of the Original Triage Cy
cle, what I have called the "negligence cycle," and add a new element to the
mix. Let us imagine that the driver who would like to take Dudley to the ER
to have his pinkie fixed first asks the endangered bystanders whether they
would agree to let him do so, say, by offering them some money in return.
Let us suppose that they consent to assume that risk. Absent their consent,
we know the driver would not be permitted to race his car to the ER. Has the
bystanders' explicit assumption of risk changed anything?
We could now completely retrace our earlier analysis of why recogniz
ing Silvia's consent in the Original Triage Cycle is problematic, or rather,
ineffective. The argument would in every respect go as before. But even if
we did, we would not yet have dealt with the typical case of consent to a
risky activity. That is because the Original Triage Cycle-and its negligence
counterpart-has a peculiar triangular structure, whereas the typical as
sumption of risk situation has a much simpler, dyadic structure. In the
Original Triage Cycle, Silvia's consent could not affect whether she would
receive treatment. Whatever she did, Dudley would be the one receiving
treatment, either for his legs or for his pinkie. Similarly, in the negligence
version of this cycle, the bystanders' consent could not affect whether they
would be exposed to the driver's breakneck speeding to the ER. Whatever
they do, the driver will either take Dudley to the ER to get his legs fixed or
to get his pinkie fixed. The typical assumption of risk case of course is not
like that, but we can modify our examples slightly and will then produce a
situation quite like the usual assumption of risk situation.
Really, all we need to do is delete from our negligence cycle one of the
alternatives, namely Dudley's two-leg injury. In other words, let us suppose
that Dudley has not suffered any injury to his legs. The only injury he suf
fered is that to his pinkie. He continues to be as eager as before to speed to
the nearest ER, come what may. Let us now suppose that Dudley offers the
bystanders some money for their consent to putting up with the dangerous
ER vehicle speeding by, and let us suppose they accept it. Should that con
sent be effective? What happens to the arguments made in the earlier
context? Do they still apply? If so, what do they look like? The answer is
that they will need to be adapted a little, but they pretty much work
as before.
As before, there are a variety of easily overlooked indirect ways in
which the bystanders' consent is clearly not effective. First, the bystanders
will not be able to alienate their self-help rights: in other words, whatever
major force they might be able to use against third parties, in defense of
those body parts they have put at risk by letting Dudley speed past them,
Dudley will not be able to use the same amount of force to protect his
risk. The main puzzle raised by the secondary assumption of risk is this: the plaintiff engages in an
activity despite the fact that he knows full well that it is very risky. He never actually consents and
the question then arises whether his actions are to be deemed as tantamount to consent. In the cases
I am considering, no one disputes that the defendant consented, and meant to consent, but we none
theless have doubts about the validity of his consent. For further background, see Simons, Full
Preference, supra note 2.
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pinkie. Second, the bystanders will not be able to alienate their due-care
rights: whatever precautions third parties are required to take with regard to
the bystanders' safety will be greater than the amount they will be required
to take with regard to the safety of Dudley's pinkie. (Conversely, Dudley
will not be able to impose on others the same risks on behalf of his pinkie as
the bystanders could impose on others on behalf of their own bodily safety.)
Third, the bystanders will not be able to alienate their necessity and duress
rights: whatever serious crimes they might be entitled to commit to avert a
threat to their bodily safety, Dudley will not be able to do something equally
serious to protect his pinkie. Finally, the bystanders will not be able to trans
fer their compensation rights to Dudley: whatever amount they might be
entitled to if someone inflicts a major injury on them, Dudley will not be
able to demand an equal amount of compensation if someone should in the
future injure his pinkie.
What now of the key issue: should not the bystanders' consent at least
prevent the driver and Dudley from being liable for a crime or a tort if an
accident occurs? The problem is that if we were to give the bystanders' con
sent such effect, we would, as in the original triage case, run into a problem
having to do with the nature of the stake they have in Dudley's decision. The
problem, however, is subtler than in the original triage case. Let us suppose
that the driver starts driving Dudley to the ER at breakneck speed without
first obtaining the bystanders' consent and see what difficulties this will now
give rise to.
(1) The self-help problem. By driving at such a dangerous speed without
the bystanders' consent, the driver is in effect launching an assault on their
bodily safety. This entitles the bystanders to respond with some measure by
way of self-defense. But suppose they would have been willing to give their
consent to the driver's actions for a certain amount of money, had he but
offered it, and suppose we would view that consent as valid. The driver 's
wrong would then have to be interpreted as simply depriving them of that
sought-after sum of money. Put this way, it seems awkward, of course, to say
that they are entitled to use force to stop him. They would not, after all, be
permitted to use force to protect a monetary entitlement! In other words,
once we allow consent, we run into a difficulty with defining the bystanders'
stake in their safety. Do we say it is substantial enough to warrant the use of
force, because it is their bodies that are under attack? Or do we say that, in
truth, only money is at stake, so they cannot so respond?
(2) The due-care problem. Suppose the bystanders faced some threat to
their bodily integrity and could only avoid it through some action that would
impose great risks on others. Given that what they have at stake is their life
and limb, we will tend to allow them to impose quite substantial risks to that
end. But suppose they are about to give up the safety of their life and limb
for some relatively modest sum of money. Now it seems strange to allow
them to impose such risks on others. They are in effect doing it only for the
sake of the money. (Conversely, should the bystanders be able to insist that
others take costly precautions to avoid harming their life and limb, when
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they are in fact about to exchange them for quite possibly a much lower sum
in their deal with Dudley?)
(3) The necessity and duress problems. Suppose the bystanders could
only avert some major calamity to themselves by committing some serious
crime. Depending on the seriousness of the calamity and the relative seri
ousness of the crime, the necessity and duress defense would permit them to
so act. But now suppose that they are in fact about to subject themselves to
the high probability of such a calamity for some sum of money that Dudley
is offering them. Now they would in effect be committing those crimes for
the sake of a certain sum of money, just the sort of thing that the necessity
and duress defense generally do not protect.
(4) The measure-of-harm problem. If Doc and Dudley speed to the ER
without asking the bystanders' consent and injure them, what should be the
measure of compensation? Should we be constrained to limit it to the
amount they would have settled for, had Dudley tried to buy their rights? Or
suppose the opposite to be the case: suppose they would never have settled
for a sum of money as small as what they would ordinarily obtain by way of
compensation for a tort injury. Will their idiosyncratic preferences entitle
them to this larger sum? Note what it will lead to if we give their prefer
ences that much weight: someone might start walking around with a sign
tied to him that warns potential tortfeasors, "If you jostle me, I ask $1 mil
28
lion per jostle."
At this point I expect the reader to balk. It would seem as though I have
proven much too much. I seem to be saying that it is impossible for people
to successfully consent to risk under any and all circumstances. But that is
in fact not the conclusion to be drawn from what I have said. The difficulties
I have described do not arise in connection with all assumptions of risk.
They are peculiar to cases in which the victim assumes the risk of personal
injury. When property damage is involved, the analysis no longer applies. So
for instance, when property changes hands, there is no problem in transfer
ring along with it all the self-help rights the transferor enjoyed to the
transferee. The same goes for the transferor's due-care rights, and his neces
sity and duress rights. (Things are less clear with regard to his measure-of
harm rights.) With regard to property, the transferee is thus able to relatively
smoothly step into the shoes of the transferor and give the transferor's con
sent the fullest possible effect.
Our analysis thus fits rather nicely with our intuitions and practices con
cerning the assumption of risk. The usual discomfort felt with the
I have not carried the parallel to the triage cycle as far as it could go. One could, for
28.
instance, strengthen the argument further by imagining (as I did there) a situation in which some
thing or someone threatens to rearrange things in such a way that the bystanders, without first giving
their explicit consent, receive the payoff they would be willing to accept in return for allowing the
speeding, and Dudley would be carried at the desired speed to the hospital. One could then ask the
question, how much of an interest do the bystanders have in the non-occurrence of such an event? If
we measure the depth of their interest in the same way as before, by asking about their "due-care
interest," their "necessity interest," etc., the answer will be that they have only the slightest interest
at stake. That in tum suggests that the presence or absence of their consent should not be regarded as
something of great significance.
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assumption of risk ordinarily only relates to personal injury, not property
damage. Our analysis also makes it clear that there is nothing, strictly speak
ing, illogical about having an assumption-of-risk defense, only that it is in
severe tension with other doctrines we prize even more than the right of
free choice.
C. Implications for Specific Performance, Self-Enslavement,

Organ Lotteries, and Draconian Penalties
I promised at the outset that my analysis would shed light on the vexing
long-standing issue of why the law does not grant specific performance for
personal service contracts. One hornbook answer is that personal service
contracts are very hard to specifically enforce: we can force the opera singer
to sing, but we cannot force her to sing well. Another hombook answer is
that forcing someone to render a personal service is akin to slavery. Neither
of these two answers seems very satisfactory. Each really only explains why
parties might not want to enter into a specifically enforceable personal ser
vice contract in the first place. The impresario has to worry that no court
could ever force the singer he hired to sing well; the singer will worry about
having made herself a temporary slave. Suppose, however, that the parties
are willing to set aside these worries. They really would like to commit to a
specifically enforceable personal service contract. Why does the law not
29
let them?
The beginnings of an answer, strangely enough, can be found in the law
of rape. For intercourse to count as consensual, the kind of consent that
makes a commercial bargain consensual will not suffice. Commercial bar
gains simply require advance consent. Consensual intercourse requires
contemporaneous consent. But while the requirement of contemporane
ous-as opposed to advance--consent is most conspicuous in the context of
intercourse, it is by no means peculiar to it. It would seem that advance con
sent to any kind of bodily invasion has to be contemporaneous: sports,
massage, surgery, not to mention voluntary euthanasia (in jurisdictions that
permit it) all require not just consent, but contemporaneous consent. The
ban on specific performance of personal service contracts thus seems like
just another manifestation of the same phenomenon.
In a way, this simply broadens the mystery. Why does consent to bodily
invasions have to be contemporaneous when it does not have to be with re
gard to other kinds of transactions? Why treat voluntary ex ante
commitments concerning our bodies so very differently from similar com
mitments with regard to other assets?
Let us see how our analysis of the triage cycle serves to demystify what
is going on here. For this purpose, it will be helpful to construct yet another
version of that cycle. Previous cycles were constructed by combining the
Original Triage Cycle with the doctrines of negligence and necessity. Our
next cycle will be constructed by combining it with the act-omission doc29.

See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 1 6.5 (5th ed. 2003).
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trine. By act-omission doctrine, I am simply referring to the rule that, absent
certain special duty-creating relationships, a defendant is not liable for
merely letting someone be harmed, as opposed to committing a harmful act
against him.
It is not immediately obvious how one might recreate a version of the
triage cycle in the context of the act-omission doctrine. Negligence and ne
cessity have a certain basic structure in common, which they share with the
Original Triage Cycle: they involve the weighing of harms (albeit in slightly
different ways). That makes it easy to construct a version of the Original
Triage Cycle around them. Now, although the act-omission doctrine does
not involve a weighing of harms, it does involve something sufficiently
similar-a weighing of means-for us to be able to construct something
similar to our triage cycle. Let us see what such a cycle would look like.
The act-omission doctrine, like all legal rules, tells us how to choose
30
among certain alternatives. But unlike the doctrines we have looked at so
far, it tells us to choose on the basis of the means these alternatives entail,
rather than the ends. To be more precise, given the choice between helping
someone escape death and letting him die, the act-omission doctrine tells me
that I am entitled to produce his death, so long as I do so by the innocent
means of an omission, rather than the culpable means of an act. Making this
choice involves a kind of weighing. Courses of conduct that cause their
harmful effects by way of an omission are to be counted no worse than
courses of conduct that cause no harmful effects whatsoever and are to be
counted superior to courses of conduct that cause less harmful conse
quences by way of an act. In carrying out this weighing, the "means" aspect
of the course of conduct-whether it is an act or an omission-is the only
thing that matters.
Now that we have reconceived of the act-omission doctrine as a kind of
weighing, a cycle can be constructed pretty much along the same lines as
before. The kind of example that fits the bill is one that will already be fa
miliar from other contexts. Victim is drowning. Defendant, a medical
experimenter, sees what is going on from afar. It so happens that he is look
ing for someone to be the guinea pig for a risky vaccination he has
developed. He decides to rescue the drowning man and, immediately upon
dragging him ashore, injects him with the vaccine. The medication leaves
the man paralyzed from the waist down. Is the defendant liable for what he
31
has done?
The cycle that inheres in this example goes like this. Defendant faces
three possible options:
(I) Defendant could rescue Victim outright, and leave it at that.
(2) Defendant could let Victim drown.

(3) Defendant could rescue Victim and then try out the vaccine on him.
30.

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.0 1 ( 1 962).

3 1 . One prominent place where examples of this kind are considered in some depth is
SHELLY KAGAN, THE LIMITS OF MORALITY 94- 1 0 1 ( 1 989).
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As between ( 1 ) and (2), rescuing the Victim outright or letting him
drown, Defendant is entitled to opt for the latter because of the act-omission
doctrine. As between (2) and (3), letting the Victim drown or saving and
vaccinating him, it seems he should be entitled to opt for (3) since that im
proves both his and the Victim's lot. He does no harm, and the move is
Pareto-optimal. Yet, as between (3) and (1), saving the Victim and vaccinat
ing him, or simply saving him, it seems he is only entitled to opt for ( 1 ) .
Having saved someone's life i n the past i s not usually thought t o entitle you
to subsequently injure him.
Next let us add the element of consent into our act-omission cycle. Let
us suppose that prior to rescuing Victim, Defendant asks him whether he
would agree to letting himself be injected. Victim, realizing that he would
still come out as a net beneficiary in this transaction, says yes. Having
dragged Victim ashore, is Defendant now in fact able to do what he was not
allowed to do before? For many people, the intuitive answer is no. But how
32
can we explain this glaring interference with free choice?
All we need do to find an answer is to transpose our analysis of the
Original Triage Cycle and our reasons for disallowing consent to make a
difference there into the act-omission setting. Let us ask ourselves what it
would mean if the consent of Victim vis-a-vis Defendant in the act-omission
scenario were completely effective. It would mean that all the rights Victim
had vis-a-vis his body prior to the rescue would now protect the promissory
interest Defendant has acquired as a result of his deal with Victim. What are
those rights? They include some, by now, familiar rights as well as some
others. Here is a non-exclusive list:
33
( 1 ) Self-help rights. When the drowning victim in my rescue hypotheti
cal refuses to abide by his original promise, he is of course violating the
rescuer's promissory right to carry out his experiment. But that promissory
right appears not to be on a par with other, more serious rights, like the right
to bodily integrity or even just plain vanilla property rights. It seems that the
owner of a promissory right will not be allowed to protect his interest by the
same forcible means he might use against a thief who appropriated some
thing in his actual possession. Thus the rescuer will not be able to use
physical force to compel the drowning victim to submit to the vaccination.
There is nothing terribly mysterious about this. This is how self-defense
works: we are entitled to use force with regard to some things that we have a
strong claim to, albeit a weak desire, and not with regard to other things that
we have a weak claim to, albeit a strong desire. Property is something we

32.
Some might think this is simply a case of coercion, the choice facing Victim being so
dire. While I am doubtful, we could, at the price of making the example a little more complicated,
eliminate this feature of the case. We could arrange things such that Victim could in fact achieve his
own rescue but only at some significant cost to his health (or if that too still seems too coercive, at
some material cost, perhaps the destruction of some property he has on himself or the loss of some
heavy valuables attached to his body). To avoid paying this high price, he agrees to Defendant's
proposed deal.
33. That is, the right to use relatively intrusive physical means to vindicate one's interests
against an invader.
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have a weaker claim to than bodily integrity, hence less force may be used to
protect the former than the latter. And promissory rights give rise to even
weaker claims than property rights and hence force may not be used to pro
tect such rights.
34
(2) Due-care rights. We do not generally think that third parties have
the same obligation to avoid inadvertently interfering with a promissory
right as to avoid interfering with the more substantial rights to property and
bodily integrity. If person X engages in a risky activity that might interfere
with the transfer of some property that Y has promised to Z, he will not be
treated like someone who engages in a risky activity that might destroy
property already owned by Z. Nor will Z be able to impose significant risks
on third parties while he tries to ensure that Y performs his promise to him.
35
(3) Necessity and duress rights. What this would mean here is that
Defendant would be able to commit some wrong against a third party to
protect his promissory right. We do not, in general, think that someone
would be allowed to do that in the same way and to the same extent as when
he is seeking to prevent a piece of property from being taken out of
his possession.
(4) Rights against governmental takings. When the government expropri
ates someone's property, it is obligated to compensate him. If the government
does something that deprives him of a promissory right he previously enjoyed,
the obligation to compensate does not kick in. That indirectly testifies to the
much less sturdy nature of a promissory right, and the comparable weakness
of the claim it represents. In the context of my rescue example, if the govern
ment were to do something that suddenly deprived the rescuer of the
possibility of carrying out his planned experiment on the drowning victim,
that would not be considered a taking that calls for compensation.
(5) Rights protected by the criminal law. One's body and one's physical
property are protected by criminal statutes. Their invasion amounts to homi
cide, mayhem, theft, etc. Not so with promissory rights. Their violation is
merely a civil matter, apparently because the right seems too flimsy to war
rant more. When the drowning victim breaches his promise to submit to the
rescuer's vaccination, we do not equate that with an invasion of rescuer's
property rights.
Given the flimsiness of that right and given how little the rescuer can do
to vindicate it, the fact that a court cannot force the drowning victim to
submit to the vaccination no longer seems very surprising. It seems entirely
in keeping with the denial of those other rights. But this does not just ex
plain the impermissibility of enforcing personal service contracts by
injunction or by self-enslavement (which really amounts to the same thing);

34. That is, the right to insist on adequate precautions by those whose risky conduct endan
gers one's interests and the corresponding right to impose certain risks on others in the course of
pursuing one's interests.
35.
That is, the right to commit certain kinds of wrongdoing if they are necessary to protect
one's interests.
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it also casts new light on two other situations in which consent has been
viewed as puzzlingly ineffective.
The first of these are organ lotteries. Suppose someone were to found a
36
"kidney club," which would operate as follows. If any member of the club
should suffer total kidney failure and need a kidney transplant, a lottery will
be held, as a result of which some other healthy member will be required to
donate one of his two kidneys to his ailing comrade. Doing so of course will
require him to undergo onerous and not entirely risk-free surgery, but be
yond that will not put him at any further risk. Giving up one of two kidneys
does not in fact increase one's chances of dying of kidney disease. Any dis
ease that might befall one's kidneys almost invariably befalls both, so that
the second kidney virtually never functions as a "spare" for its failing coun
terpart. Joining a kidney club makes good rational sense. It assures that one
will have a kidney in case one should have total kidney failure, and it does
so at the price of the small possibility of having to donate one of one's own
kidneys. Now the interesting question: suppose a member refuses to un
dergo the kidney-sacrificing surgery after he has "lost" at one of these
lotteries. Can he be forced to undergo it? The foregoing analysis corrobo
rates and explains what intuition already counseled: no.
The requirement of contemporaneous consent can also explain some
thing else. The question has sometimes arisen, what exactly would be unfair
about draconian criminal penalties so long as these are announced well in
37
advance? Its victims know what might happen to them if they engage in
certain activities that carry that risk. What could they possibly complain
about? To be sure, sometimes the problem is that the draconian penalties are
attached to conduct that people should be free to engage in, but often they
are simply attached to conduct that we are perfectly comfortable criminaliz
ing but do not think deserves such disproportionate punishment. Indeed
often it is the case that someone might well have voted favorably-or would
have voted favorably-in a referendum in which such penalties had to be
approved and then suddenly found himself at the receiving end of them. We
can now say why his prior vote--even if construed as consent-does not
amount to much. Punishment typically involves invasions of the body (for
example, confinement) and with regard to such invasions advance consent
does not count. Monetary penalties of course would be a different story,
38
which also fits with our intuitions.

36.

See John Harris, The Survival Lottery, 50 PHIL. 8 1 ( 1 975).

37. See Larry Alexander, Consent, Punishment, and Proponionality, 15 PHIL. & Pus. AFF.
178 ( 1 986).
38. As an aside on a matter that surely deserves more extended treatment elsewhere, this
should give one a new perspective on all kinds of social contract arguments. Social contract argu
ments usually refer to a person's ex ante consent (sometimes actual, more often hypothetical) to a
vast range of things, including many that would constitute invasions of the body. What I have said
casts a large shadow over such arguments.
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D. Provisional Summary
It is time to take stock. Where does all of this leave us?
We have uncovered some unfamiliar problems with certain kinds of con
sent. We have found that sometimes things are inalienable that we barely
suspected harbored such a difficulty. The root source of the difficulty seems
to be that it is very difficult at times to combine respect for consent with
respect for other, even more deeply entrenched legal doctrines. If we try to
respect them both we end up in a cycle. The examples I gave-triage, as
sumption of risk, specific performance, pollution permits-surely do not
exhaust the situations in which respect for consent generates cycles. They
are likely to be only the most clear-cut instances of it.
It is natural to wonder whether there is not a more economical way to
characterize this new kind of consent-impairing exception than merely to
say that consent fails where it generates cycles. If we want to check whether
consent fails by reason of force or fraud or incompetence, we immediately
know what we need to look for. But if we want to check whether it gives rise
to cycles, it is much less evident how we should proceed. I am afraid that
this is simply an unfortunate fact about this new kind of exception. It is
surely the main reason why the exception has been largely overlooked so
far. Nonetheless, I think I can furnish at least a tip-off for when a situation is
likely to raise cycling difficulties. The tip-off is that one or more of the par
ties to a transaction are exchanging something to which they have a weak
claim (as opposed to a strong desire !) for something else to which they have
a comparatively much greater claim: a two-leg injury (strong claim) for a
pinkie-injury (weak claim), as in my triage case; personal safety (strong
claim) for money (weak claim), as in my assumption-of-risk case; personal
autonomy (strong claim) for a promissory interest (weak claim), as in my
39
specific performance case. I do not know whether the presence of such
vastly disparate claims is a necessary or sufficient condition for consent to
produce cycling, but it is definitely a tip-off.
Whether respect for consent in a given case should be ignored on ac
count of cycling is not an either/or matter. Consent might give rise to a lot of
very significant cycles or it might give rise to only a few relatively insignifi
cant cycles. Even the least controversial kind of contractual transaction
harbors within it the possibility of at least a few small cycles, but we should
40
not on that account expect it to fail. But the more serious the cycling gets,
the more likely it is that consent will fail. That this is a matter of degree
should not unduly concern us. The same is surely true of the more familiar
categories of exception: force, fraud, incompetence etc.

39.
By "personal autonomy," I am referring to the would-be-rescuer's right to abstain from
the rescue; by "promissory interest," I am referring to his contractual right to inject the vaccine into
the person he saved.

40. Every time someone makes a present payment for a future performance, he is giving up
something to which he has a strong claim (property) for something to which he has a much weaker
claim (the fulfilment of a promise of future performance). This phenomenon can be used to generate
cycles. But they won't be nearly as worrisome as the ones we have seen.

Michigan Law Review

658

[Vol. 1 04:627

IV. FURTHER RAMIFICATIONS : THE ROLE OF
WELFARE ECONOMICS IN THE LAW

A. Fairness versus Welfare: The A rgument of Kap/ow and Shavell
We come now to Kaplow and S havell's recent temper-raising book on
the conflict between welfare and fairness to which what I have to say has
great relevance.
Combining a host of fresh insights with reinvigorated versions of older
arguments, the book presents an extremely powerful challenge to those of us
who think that legal analysis and the design of legal rules are not exclusively
about finding rules that maximize welfare as defined by a suitable social
welfare function. The book's argument consists of four parts: first, a demon
stration of the incompatibility between any kind of fairness notion and the
Pareto principle; second, a demonstration that this is not merely a theoretical
possibility but an ubiquitous occurrence in the law, from torts, to contracts,
to property, to criminal law and civil and criminal procedure; third, that the
fairness theories that engender this conflict don't offer any account as to
why this inevitable feature is at all desirable or even tolerable and of how
they can continue to remain plausible in light of it; and fourth, a sketch of an
evolutionary explanation of why fairness notions, despite their welfare
reducing properties, have gained such a hold over our intuitions. What I
have to say has bearing mostly on the first of these four parts and somewhat
on the second and third.
Let me first briefly sketch out, in very stripped-down but I think for our
purposes quite adequate fashion, their two key arguments about the tension
between the Pareto principle and fairness.
( 1) The Argument from the Reciprocal Case. Kaplow and Shavell ask us
to consider a world in which various torts are committed by various tortfea
sors against various innocent victims. They ask us to picture this world in a
particular way: we are to assume that over a lifetime everyone will end up
being a victim as often as he will end up being a tortfeasor. In other words,
he imposes as much risky and injurious conduct on others as he is subjected
to by them. What would a welfare-oriented economist say about such a
world? He would say that there should probably not be any compensation
for tortious injuries in such a world because everyone will be paying out as
much as he will be taking in, and since the process of litigating such cases
and enforcing the resulting verdicts will cost money, everyone would be
41
better off if all injuries are simply allowed to lie where they fall.
What will the typical fairness theorist-for example, someone who
thinks that negligently inflicted harm needs to be compensated-say about
such a world? He will, of course, insist on compensation in every one of
these cases because that is what he in general would insist on. Yet in this
case it squarely puts him into conflict with the Pareto principle since every
one would be better off if no such compensation were paid.
41.

KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 7 , at 100- 1 3.
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This is a deceptively simple argument with a really surprising punch,
which is why no one else thought of using it before. To fully appreciate it,
let me quote what Kaplow and Shaven specifically say about it:
[M]ost corrective justice theorists give little or no attention to the recipro
cal case . . . . Yet it seems to us that any satisfactory normative theory must
ultimately address this basic, paradigmatic situation. [So far it simply]
does not appear to have been recognized that applying any notion of fair
ness in the reciprocal case entails making everyone worse off in every
instance in which the principle leads to a result different from that under
welfare economics. That any normative theory involving a notion of fair
ness has this implication in the simple, reciprocal case suggests that the
theory suffers from a fundamental problem, not one of the sort that might
be avoided merely by making minor adjustments . . . .
It will not do, for example, to argue that the theory remains valid and
compelling generally, subject to some special exception for the reciprocal
case, when the central determinants of the applicability of the theory have
42
nothing to do with whether the reciprocal context applies.

(2) The More General Argument. Consider two social policies, the Just
Policy and the Unjust Policy. The Unjust Policy would create a society en
joying greater welfare than the Just Policy; the Just Policy would create a
society that would enjoy greater fairness than the Unjust Policy. Now al
though the Unjust Policy creates greater welfare than the Just Policy, that
does not of course mean that it is Pareto-superior to the Just Policy, since
not everyone is better off under the Unjust Policy than he would be under
the Just Policy. Nevertheless, Kaplow and Shavell argue, we can be logically
certain that a hypothetical Second Unjust Policy exists that is as unjust as
the first, but Pareto-superior to the Just Policy. Merely imagine a policy that
gives everyone a multiple of the income they would have under the Unjust
Policy, while keeping everything else the same, most especially the low
level of fairness. If we make the multiple large enough, everyone under this
Second Unjust Policy would be better off than they would be under the Just
Policy. In other words, according to whatever standards of welfare or fair
ness we employ, there is the logical possibility of a society that is Pareto
superior to one that is fairer.
B . Kap/ow and Shavell 's Precursor: Sen 's Paradox
Kaplow and Shavell's claim about the incompatibility of the Pareto prin
ciple and fairness has, as they fully acknowledge, a famous precursor known
as Sen's libertarian paradox. What the Sen paradox (not really a paradox,
just a counterintuitive thesis) claimed was that the Pareto principle is in
compatible with granting people anything one might call a "right." That of
course is a special case of the fairness claim. Granting people some rights is
presumably one (very special) form of fairness. Sen's argument proceeds
42.

Id. at 1 06--0 7 & n.55 (emphasis added).
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rather differently from Kaplow and Shavell's, and he draws different lessons
from it than Kaplow and Shaven draw from theirs. Here is how it goes.
In the course of proving Arrow's theorem, one is forced to prove a pow
erful little intermediate result, which basically says that if in making a
collective choice, someone is "decisive" between two particular alterna
43
tives, and if the Pareto principle holds, then he is bound to be decisive as
between any alternatives whatsoever. In other words, he is a "dictator."
While teaching Arrow's theorem and staring at this intermediate result, it
occurred to Sen that one could give it a rather powerful interpretation that
would make this intermediate result interesting in its . own right rather than
merely as a stepping stone toward Arrow's theorem. In a society in which
people have rights, they are bound to be "decisive" as between some alterna
tives, at a minimum with regard to such trivial matters as whether they sleep
on their stomachs or on their backs and quite possibly with regard to more
momentous matters such as whether to read a certain book or not. What Ar
row's intermediate result shows is that as soon as one gives people these
44
modest rights one has given up on the Pareto principle.
Sen then offered an illustration that has since become famous. He imag
ines a society of two, named Mr. Lewd and Mr. Prude. There is in this
society exactly one copy of D.H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley 's Lover
(much in the news when Sen first published his paradox). Mr. Prude would
prefer that no one got to look at this, to him, repellent book. Mr. Lewd by
contrast would much enjoy reading it. What he would enjoy even more,
however, would be for Mr. Prude to read it, so as to loosen him up a bit. In
deed if Prude were to read it, that would make Lewd even happier than if he
himself got to read it. The result of this situation, argues Sen, is a conflict
between what he calls "minimal rights" and the Pareto principle. We cannot,
he says, grant Mr. Lewd and Mr. Prude the minimal right to decide whether
they are going to read the book, while also endorsing the Pareto principle.
The argument, in brief, is this: If we grant each party the right whether to
read or not, then Mr. Lewd will choose to read, and Mr. Prude will choose
not to read. But both of them would be happier if Mr. Prude read and Mr.
Lewd did not read (because Lewd wants to loosen up Prude, and Prude
wants to reform Lewd), which is therefore the Pareto-superior outcome they
45
have failed to reach by exercising their rights.
43. In other words, as long as he prefers alternative ( I ) to alternative (2), then that is how the
social ranking will rank it. If he prefers the reverse, then that is how the social ranking will rank it.
44.
It is a curious fact about Sen's discovery that when one states it in this abstract way, it
seems convincing to most people, but when one illustrates it as Sen does, it convinces very few. The
reasons for this should become apparent in my reanalysis of the Sen paradox later on.

45.

See generally Sen, supra note 5. Here is Sen's own, fuller explanation:

[T]he social choice [is] between three alternatives involving Mr. A reading a copy of Lady
Chatterly ·s Lover, Mr. B reading it, or no one reading it. We name these alternatives a, b, and
c, respectively. Mr. A, the prude, prefers most that no one reads it, next that he reads it, and last
that "impressionable" Mr. B be exposed to it, i.e., he prefers c to a, and a to b. Mr. B, the las
civious, prefers that either of them should read it rather than neither, but further prefers that
Mr. A should read it rather than he himself, for he wants Mr. A to be exposed to Lawrence's
prose. Hence he prefers a to b, and b to c. A liberal argument can be made for the case that
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Sen concludes from this that we must give up on the Pareto principle.
After all, he says, we cannot give up altogether on rights. Surely there are
some things-like deciding whether to sleep on one's front or back-that
we must leave to people to decide for themselves. Kaplow and Shavell of
course drew the opposite conclusion. Given the choice between fairness and
46
the Pareto principle, they think the Pareto principle should be chosen.
C. The Other Side of the Debate: Chang and His Precursors
Over the years Sen's claim has come in for vehement criticism and so
has Kaplow and Shavell's. Let us see what the principal critiques have said.

1 . The Standard Critique of Sen
The standard critique, reiterated again and again, with ever mounting
fury by Sen's critics at his refusal to accept it, has most recently been stated
41
yet again in Richard Epstein's book Skepticism and Freedom. What the
standard critique argues is that Sen's claim is based on a patent misunder
standing of rights. He seems to think, the critics say, that rights are
inalienable, but that is an extremely eccentric and implausible view of
rights. If we treat rights as alienable, then Lewd and Prude will strike a bar
gain whereby Lewd agrees to give up his right to read the book in return for
Prude's obligating himself to read it. Here is how Epstein puts the matter:
In his essay "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Amartya Sen seeks
to show . . . why it is impossible to reconcile a belief in the liberty of indi
vidual choice with the achievement of social efficiency, as measured by the
familiar Paretian standard . . . .

. . . [T]he two parties [in his example] are at loggerheads over whether
both or neither read [Lady Chatterley's Lover] . Lewd prefers the former,
and Prude the latter. But they do have a limited area of agreement in that
both men prefer that Prude not Lewd read the book if only one does. In
this austere universe, however, Lewd reasons that he cannot compel Prude
given the choice between Mr.

A reading it and no one reading

it, his own preference should be

reflected by social preference. So that society should prefer that no one reads it, rather than
having Mr.

a.

A

read what he plainly regards as a dreadful

book.

Hence c is socially preferred to

Similarly, a liberal argument exists in favor of reflecting Mr. B's preference in the social

choice between Mr. B reading it and no one reading it. Thus b is preferred to c. Hence society
should prefer Mr. B reading it to no one reading it, and the latter to Mr.
Mr. B reading it is Pareto-worse than

ranking, then a is preferred to

b.

Mr. A

A reading it.

However,

reading it, . . . and if social preference honors that

Hence every alternative can be seen to be worse than some

other. And there is thus no best alternative in this set . . . .

AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 80-8 1 ( 1 970).
46. That does not mean they do not think people should be able to decide whether they sleep
on their backs or not. Rather, they think that situations in which this is the Pareto-optimal outcome
are extremely unlikely to arise. And if they do arise, it will be because the parties have agreed to do
so as a result of a Pareto-optimal bargain.
47.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM: A MODERN CASE FOR CLASSICAL
LIBERALISM (2003).
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(as a free agent) to read the book, so Lewd has no reason not to read it
himself. Prude realizes that he cannot stop Lewd (also a free agent) from
reading this book, so he sees no point in reading it himself. The principle
of liberty is thus said to lead to an outcome that neither prefers: Lewd, not
Prude, reads the volume. Sen claims that his example exposes the weak
ness of the [Pareto principle] . . . .
But why ? The original example did not assume a libertarian universe,
for neither of the participants is allowed to trade with the other. Relax the
prohibition and allow trade, and the paradox begins to unravel. Now the
simplest deal is that Lewd proposes to Prude that Prude read the book and
Lewd not. If these are the only choices on the table, then both sides should
assent since each is better off than before. The conclusion that one draws
from this is not the impossibility of being a Paretian liberal, but the neces

sity of being a Paretian liberal with an unwavering commitment to free
trade.

48

Epstein here is echoing others, like Russell Hardin, who called Sen
"transparently wrong" for not recognizing that "among the most important
of all rights in the liberal canon are the right of exchange and its correlative
49
right of contract."

2. Chang 's Critique of Kap/ow and Shavell
One of the first and most trenchant critiques of Kaplow and Shavell's
50
thesis comes from Howard Chang. What he ingeniously demonstrates is
that, although they do not realize it, their argument is subject to a very
clever modified version of the Standard Critique of Sen. The heart of his
argument, roughly paraphrased, runs as follows:
Kaplow and Shavell claim that no fairness theory can possibly accom
modate the Pareto principle. I will show you how to construct one that does.
Take any fairness theory you find attractive and simply add the Pareto prin
ciple as a further requirement. In other words, suppose your fairness theory
ranks three states of affairs thus: first A, then B, then C. Suppose further that
the Pareto principle would rank C ahead of A. Then under my new Faimess
plus-Pareto theory, we would re-rank our choices so that C ranks ahead of
A.
Now, proceeding in this way will on reflection tum out to be unexpect
edly complicated. How are we to rank B relative to C? Since B is fairer than
C and C is not Pareto-superior to B, it would seem that B should continue to
be ranked ahead of C. That would suggest that the final ranking should be:
first B , then C, then A. B ut wait a minute: We assumed A was fairer than B .
S o how can w e let B be ranked more highly than A? Something has to give.
We will either have to put C ahead of B despite the fact that B is fairer and

48.

Id. at ! 65--66 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

49.

RUSSELL HARDIN, MORALITY WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON 109 ( 1 988).

50. Howard Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto
Principle, 1 1 0 YALE L.J. 1 73 (2000).
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C is not Pareto-superior to B, or we will have to put B ahead of A despite the
fact that A is fairer and B is not Pareto-superior to A. We cannot have both.
What this shows us is that we cannot simply add the Pareto principle on
top of whatever fairness theory we have. We will need to adapt the fairness
theory in a variety of ways to avoid generating inconsistencies. This can get
pretty complicated where more than three alternatives are involved. I have
however devised an algorithm that allows us to do this relatively straight
forwardly . . . .
Chang then lays out his very deft algorithm, the details of which need
not preoccupy us here. What is important for our purposes is that he has
found a way of taking just about any fairness theory and "blending" it, as it
were, with the Pareto principle into a hybrid theory that seems to contradict
Kaplow and Shavell's claim that all fairness theories are necessarily incon
sistent with the Pareto principle.
B ut if Chang is right and Kaplow and Shaven are wrong, where exactly
are the holes in their argument? Well, in fact there are no holes. Rather, what
Chang has shown is that Kaplow and Shavell's argument depends on a cru
cial assumption about fairness theories, which he does not believe they are
entitled to make and they believe they are. To see what this assumption is,
let us reconsider what I called Kaplow and Shavell's "General Argument".
Here is how I summarized it:
Consider two social policies, the Just Policy and the Unjust Policy. The
Unjust Policy would create a society enjoying greater welfare than the Just
Policy; the Just Policy would create a society that would enjoy greater
fairness than the Unjust Policy. Now although the Unjust Policy creates
greater welfare than the Just Policy, that does not of course mean that it is
Pareto-superior to the Just Policy, since not everyone is better off under the
Unjust Policy than he would be under the Just Policy.
Nevertheless, Kaplow and Shavell argue we can be logically certain that a
hypothetical Second Unjust Policy exists that is as unjust as the first, but
Pareto-superior to the Just Policy. Merely imagine a policy that gives eve
ryone a multiple of the income he would have under the Unjust Policy,
while keeping everything else the same, most especially the low level of
fairness. If we make the multiple large enough, everyone under this Second
Unjust Policy would be better off than he would be under the Just Policy.
In other words, according to whatever standards of welfare or fairness we
employ, there is the logical possibility of a society that is Pareto-superior
to one that is fairer.51

Chang would claim that at the moment at which the Unjust Society's in
come has been raised enough so that literally everyone is better off than he
would be in the Just Society, then the Unjust Society has in fact become
more (or at least no less) just than the Just Society, at least by the lights of
his fairness-plus-Pareto theories. Kaplow and Shavell find it extremely odd
that as long as even a single person in the Unjust Society is less well off
than in the Just Society, the Unjust Society counts as substantially less fair
51.

See supra p. 659.
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than the Just Society, but that at the magic moment at which even that last
person has been made merely a dollar better off than he was in the original
Unjust Society, the fairness level jumps to match or exceed that of the Just
Society. How can one dollar make such a difference? No plausible fairness
theory, they think, can harbor such discontinuities. Chang by contrast thinks
52
it can.
D. The Debate Reevaluated through the Lens of the Cycling Argument:

Why Pareto Loses to Fairness
Let us now see what this debate looks like when we think about it in
light of the cycling argument and the scenarios in the context of which we
encountered it. I will begin by looking at Kaplow and Shavell's Argument
and then turn to Sen's Paradox simply because that is the order in which the
relevant points are easiest to make.

1 . Kap/ow and Shavell Yet Again
My cycling argument partially undercuts and partially supports what
Kaplow and Shavell claim. It also partially undercuts and partially supports
what Chang claims. Let us see how.
Kaplow and Shaven argue that there is a profound tension between fair
ness and the Pareto principle. All the examples considered in this essay
exemplify this tension. In each we get into an inconsistency-producing cycle
so long as we remain committed to both the Pareto principle and some fair
ness-embodying legal principle, like the negligence doctrine, which says
that we are allowed to impose cost-benefit justified risks, or the necessity
doctrine, which says that we are allowed to impose cost-benefit justified
evils, or the act-omission doctrine, which says that people are entitled to not
be harmed by their fellow men but not necessarily to affirmative help from
them, etc. All of these examples are entirely in line with Kaplow and Shav
ell 's claim.
But there is an equally important respect in which my analysis undercuts
Kaplow and Shaven. The lesson that Kaplow and Shavell want to draw from

52.
Chang's answer is that the point at which at least one member of the Second Unjust
Society is worse off than his counterpart i n the Just Society and the point at which every last one is
better off are fundamentally different: Only in the latter case can we not in any way be said to be
sacrificing the welfare of a minority to the welfare of a majority. Only in the latter case are we not
doing anything that smacks of one of those forbidden utilitarian tradeoffs whereby we cut up one
person to use his organs to save several others. To this Kaplow and Shaven reply that Chang is in
effect attaching infinite weight to fairness by not letting it be outweighed by a sufficiently substan
tial gain to what may be a near-total majority of the society. Chang in tum notes that this is how all
lexicographic sets of principles operate and there is nothing illogical about such a lexicographic
ordering of principles. Not illogical, perhaps, argue Kaplow and Shaveil, but very, very strange. Not
so strange, says Chang.
Chang's answer to Kaplow and Shavell's Reciprocity Argument, their reply to him, his rejoin
der to them, and their surrebuttal, etc., essentially proceed by thinking of the two policies in the
reciprocal case as corresponding to the Just Society and the Second Unjust Society and adapting the
previous exchange accordingly.

February 2006]

Choice, Consent, and Cycling

665

the tension between fairness and Pareto is that we need to give up on fair
ness. They do so by making the very compelling-sounding point that the
Pareto principle is intuitively well-nigh irresistible, and that the fairness
principles which contradict it are based on much more amorphous, hard-to
state and hard-to-justify intuitions. As it turns out, however, if I am right,
they have simply not focused on the right fairness principles. The fairness
principles which contradict the Pareto principle in the context of my exam
ples are at least as, and arguably more, compelling than the Pareto principle.
Take the negligence cycle. It seems hard to resist the idea that each of us
is entitled to impose some uncompensated risks on others. It also seems
hard to resist the idea that they can only do so if, by some measure, the rea
sons for doing so are sufficiently compelling and the risks not too large in
light of those reasons. Finally, and this of course is the crux, it seems hard to
resist the idea that in making this assessment about cost-benefit justified
risks, we do not simply compare the utilities of the two parties concerned. If
we did, we would have to say that someone's desire not to miss his lunch
appointment might, if sufficiently intense, warrant his exposing someone
else to a near-certainty of a maiming. Instead we are to compare the claim
someone has to what he is seeking to accomplish (for example the lunch
appointment) with the claim his potential victim has to safety under the cir
cumstances. All of these seem at least as hard to resist as the Pareto
principle. That means that giving up on the Pareto principle is a far from
53
absurd proposition.
Just to belabor this point a little more, let's consider the act-omission
doctrine. It seems hard to resist the idea that someone has more of a claim to
not being harmed than to receiving affirmative help in some calamity. This
is of course at bottom a very libertarian idea, although many non
libertarians, if not all, would at least partially embrace it. Few would say
that our failure to render very onerous and expensive assistance to someone
who will otherwise die is to be treated as just as bad as actively killing him
by plunging a knife into him. (Surely not every TV watcher who fails to
heed Sally Struthers's exhortation to donate to UNICEF and save the life of
a child should be considered a murderer, especially not those who have al
ready given but are not giving more.) Once again it is not utilities but claims
that guide our judgment. And so here too the Pareto principle is opposed by
at least equally compelling fairness claims. This is a point that is apt to drive
committed libertarians absolutely apoplectic. It shows that the two things
which libertarians are most committed to, the idea that we have a duty not to
harm but no duty to aid and the idea of near-absolute freedom of contract
can simply not coexist. But it is a point that should make even quasi
libertarians-in other words everyone else-uncomfortable.

53. To be sure, not everyone has the same aversion to weighing the intensity of the speeder's
desire to make his lunch appointment in assessing the cost of not speeding. But I remind such read
ers that there are many other situations in which they would find it surely hard to accept that the
strength of someone's claim is governed by the intensity of his desire. My prime example for this,
offered earlier in the Article, has been property claims.
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Now nothing that I have said directly undercuts the logical correctness
of Howard Chang's claim that it is logically possible to have fairness theo
ries that respect the Pareto principle. What it does undercut is its relevance
to law. The moral precepts that underlie our most basic legal doctrines, or at
least those of criminal and tort law, are not like the "blended" fairness theo
ries Chang shows us how to construct by his algorithm. The moral
precepts underlying our most basic legal doctrines really do preclude
the Pareto principle.
What unites both Kaplow and Shavell and Chang is their commitment to
54
the Pareto principle. Kaplow and Shavell are driven by this commitment to
excise fairness from our legal doctrines. Chang is driven to construct doc
trines that no longer resemble our basic moral ideas. My cycling argument is
meant to suggest that it may be the Pareto principle that ought to yield in
stead, or at least, that judges and lawmakers who have restricted freedom of
contract under otherwise hard to account for circumstances are responding
to some quite coherent and defensible intuitions. Once we entertain this pos
sibility we will be able to account for a lot of hitherto unexplained
inalienabilities in our laws.

2. Sen Yet Again
What does my analysis imply about Sen's paradox?
As I have already indicated, many, perhaps most, people have concluded
that Sen's paradox really is no paradox at all; rather, it arises from his ex
tremely eccentric, downright question-begging conception of a right as
something which cannot be alienated. The near-universal rejection of Sen's
claim is odd for several reasons. First, it is odd because the corresponding,
even more sweeping claim by Kaplow and Shavell managed to find many
more adherents and sympathizers. It is also odd because the person whom
many would regard as the ultimate spokesman and theorist of the libertarian
point of view, Robert Nozick, actually thought Sen had posed a devilishly
difficult challenge. In the introduction to a book he wrote some decades af
ter, Anarchy, State and Utopia, he remarked in passing, and unfortunately
without further elaboration that, "Amartya Sen's work on the Paretian liberal
paradox shows that a very natural interpretation of the scope of individual
rights and liberties, and of how the choices of society should be rationally
organized, cannot easily be fit together. These notions need a new structur
55
ing." And finally there is the fact that Sen himself has been so singularly
unmoved by the criticisms.
Yet those criticisms seem awfully persuasive. Let us remind ourselves
what they are. Sen had envisioned the case of a two-person society, inhab
ited by Mr. Lewd and Mr. Prude, needing to decide which of them, if any,

54. Here, for the sake of simplicity, I am overstating Chang's position a little. He is in fact
not personally especially committed to the Pareto principle but finds it fruitful to proceed in his
essay as though he were.
55.
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should get to read a prurient book. Each of them has a right to read or not to
read. That will mean that Mr. Lewd will read and Mr. Prude will not read.
And yet, the Pareto-optimal outcome is one in which Prude reads and Lewd
does not, because Lewd would like to loosen Prude up and Prude would like
to stifle Lewd's prurient impulses. The seemingly irresistible criticism by
Sen's critics has been to say that if the rights are simply considered alien
able as rights ordinarily are, Lewd will agree not to read in return for
Prude's promise to read, and the Pareto-optimal outcome will have been
achieved without depriving anyone of his rights.
Sen's principal reply to this at first seems, and has seemed to all of his
critics, to be a very lame one. He points out that such an agreement would
not be practically feasible. It would be very intrusive, and thus liberty
offending, to monitor whether the parties are actually complying with it. It
would require checking that Prude is in fact absorbing the contents of the
book rather than merely pretending to be casting his gaze in the book's di
rection and that Lewd has not in fact secretly managed to sneak a peak at the
book after all. Critics are unmoved because we are discussing an issue of
principle, and this practical concern seems like a distraction.
My analysis will enable us to see why Sen is right, where his critics
went wrong, and how one can make sense of his infeasibility argument, or at
least show that he was groping for, though not quite wrapping his arms
around, a very valid point.
Let us take a very close look at the bargain that Sen's critics say would
eliminate the apparent tension between rights and the Pareto principle. To
begin with, let us take in fully what things are like before they enter into the
bargain and then examine what things look like afterwards. What would
happen if, prior to the bargain, either of the two tried to get his way over the
objections of the other? In other words, what would happen if Prude tried to
j ust tear Lewd's copy away from him or if Lewd tried to shove a graphically
illustrated copy in front of Prude's nose? To begin with, of course, each
would be entitled to call the police for help and to have the aggressor prose
cuted for some kind of trespass, assault, battery, or the like. Moreover, each
would be entitled to use some potent self-help remedies, indeed actual
physical force to resist the interference. They would also be able to obtain a
specific injunctive remedy to prevent the aggressor from continuing in his
aggression. They also have certain due-care rights vis-a-vis each other. Each
is required to be careful lest by culpable inadvertence he end up interfering
with the other's right to read or not read. And there are necessity and duress
rights as well: to avert such invasion, the victimized party might be able to
commit some other lesser crime, and conceivably sometimes, even a
greater one.
Now let us see how things have changed after the bargain has been
struck. Again imagine that one of the two, Lewd or Prude, aggresses against
the rights of the other. Aggressing against his rights of course will now
mean something else than before. For Prude to violate Lewd's rights no
longer means preventing him from reading the book, since Lewd already
promised not to read it. Instead, for Prude to violate Lewd's rights means

Michigan Law Review

668

[Vol. 1 04:627

not following through on his own promise to read the book that is so dis
tasteful to him. Conversely, for Lewd to violate Prude's rights no longer
means forcing him to read the book, since Prude is now obligated to do so
on his own. Rather, for Lewd to violate Prude's rights means finding a way
to sneak a peek at the book in violation of his own promise not to read it.
Suppose then one of them has thus violated the rights of the other. What
can the other do about it? A great deal less than he previously could do to
vindicate his rights. For one, he cannot summon the police to enforce his
rights, and he cannot complain about a crime. Breaching a contract is not a
56
criminal matter and will not be rectified by police intervention. In addition,
he is severely limited in the self-help remedies he can utilize. He certainly
cannot use force to compel the other to follow through on his promise. Nor
can he obtain specific injunctive relief. He no longer enjoys the same "ne
cessity" or "duress" rights he enjoyed before: he is not allowed to commit
various criminal wrongs in order to secure the performance of his promis
sory rights. Nor, finally, does he enjoy the same due-care rights as before.
The other party and third parties are not required to take the same level of
precaution to avoid interference with his contractual rights as they were re
quired to take to avoid interference with his property rights.
We know all of this intuitively, but we also know from our previous
analysis that it is an unavoidable byproduct of our commitment to certain
basic legal and moral precepts (discussed in the section on personal service
contracts). As a result the Pareto principle here breaks down: a whole host of
entitlements are in fact inalienable, despite the fact that each of the parties
would very much like them to be alienable. When Sen speaks of the "infea
sibility" of such agreements, I believe he was groping for this point, but
without, as I said, fully succeeding in wrapping his arms around it.
E. Why Giving Up on Pareto ls Less Costly

Than It Seems, or, What Are Lawyers For?
It seems like a very unpleasant prospect to have to live without the
Pareto principle. Restricting one's freedom of contract under circumstances
where everybody would be better off if we did not seems an extremely
costly way of satisfying whatever our other ethical commitments may be.
But as I will show in a moment it is not nearly as costly as it appears at first.
Consider an example. Let us return to the negligence cycle. Bystanders
might be willing to consent for suitable compensation to have the ambu
lance speed by them, and of course, Dudley is eager for that to happen as
well. An outright bargain whereby the bystanders assume the risk may now
be judged to be beyond their reach. And yet a ready substitute is in sight: if
the bystanders were paid to remove themselves from the danger zone, that
contract would pose no problems and would still effectuate the desired end.
Now of course this is a more roundabout and second best way of getting to
the outcome both sides want. It definitely is not the Pareto-optimal outcome,
56.
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but it is not so far off either. Giving up on the Pareto principle here does not
have overwhelming costs.
Let's next consider the act-omission cycle. Both the drowning victim
and the potential rescuer would like it to be possible to strike a bargain
whereby the drowning victim permits himself to be used as a guinea pig for
the rescuer's medication. Now suppose the rescuer were to find some
mechanism whereby he delivers the medication by the very process by
which he rescues the drowning victim. Perhaps by attaching a needle to the
rescue vest such that the only way to don it is to be stung by the needle.
Once again this is a second best solution. It is definitely not Pareto optimal,
but it does not run afoul of the precepts that enforcing a bargain would.
Indeed it can be argued that this is the sort of thing lawyers are in the
57
business of doing when they find suitable ways of structuring transactions.
It does seem somewhat ridiculous that such mechanisms should be available
and should be the only way of avoiding the severe costs of giving up on the
Pareto principle. Kaplow and Shaven do actually vaguely recognize this and
think it is a devastating point against fairness theories that they should result
in such maneuvers. They write:
Suppose there is a great need to build a hospital, but that inevitably at least
one worker will die in a construction accident. One presumes that most
[deontological minded philosophers] would endorse building the hospital
in such a situation. It would be said that the death of the worker is an inci
dental cost rather than an instance of a direct sacrifice. Suppose, however,
that the leader of the polity had available a button and that just before the
worker was about to die, time stood still for a moment; if the button was
pushed, the worker would die and the project would proceed to comple
tion, but if it was not pushed, the work done to date would disintegrate,
and construction would have to begin anew. (And, if further attempts were
made to build the hospital, the cycle would be repeated.) Now, pushing the
button is a direct act that sacrifices the worker, which is impermissible
[and the hospital project would have to be abandoned] . . . . It would seem
that the only alternative lesson to draw from such examples is that changes
in the technology of such things as push-buttons or in other factors that
one would have thought to be entirely arbitrary as a matter of morality are
in fact of potentially crucial moral significance under the doctrines prof
fered by certain deontological philosophers, a result that would seem to
58
require some defense.

Indeed. It does seem strange that these factors that appear entirely mor
ally arbitrary are in fact of crucial moral significance. But the only way to
deprive them of such significance is to give up on some very basic precepts
that Kaplow and Shavell, like everyone else, would find hard to give up
on-the precepts spelled out earlier in this Article.

57.

I pursued this point at some length in KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS, supra note 5.

58.

KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 347 n. 1 06.

670

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 1 04:627

CONCLUSION

Situations can be constructed in which consent fails, though not for any
of the familiar reasons, such as coercion, deception, incompetence, third
party effects, fears of commodification, unequal bargaining power, and vari
ous kinds of paternalistic concerns.
We began by considering one such situation, a stylized triage scenario,
and then showed many more mundane cases to be instances where consent
fails for analogous reasons--cases in which courts have been inclined to
deny defendants the assumption-of-risk defense, without being sure why, or
for which legislatures have created so-called victimless crimes, without be
ing sure why, or cases in which courts refuse to specifically enforce personal
service contracts even when the contract specifically provided for such en
forceability. The controversy about tradeable pollution licenses is yet
another such mundane instance.
The justification for disregarding consent is not so murky. It follows di
rectly from some extremely simple, hard to dispute premises. For instance
the idea that merely because X desires something more intensely than Y, he
does not, as a result, have a stronger legal or moral claim to it-which is just
another way of saying that there is a difference between claims and desires,
interests and preferences.
How is it that recognizing the existence of claims and the fact that they
are distinct from desires leads to the disregard of consent? Put very gener
ally, what is going on is this: when the law recognizes a claim, it implicitly
puts a value, or price, on something. When the law declares that people may
impose a risk of a certain size on others for the sake of object X but not for
the sake of object Y, or when it declares that people are required to take pre
cautions of a certain amount to avoid inadvertently damaging object X but
not object Y, or when it declares that people may use lethal force to protect
X but not Y, or when it declares that people may commit a crime to avert
harm to X but not Y, it is implicitly putting values on X and on Y, a high one
on X, and a lower one on Y. When the owner of X or of Y agrees to ex
change them for something else, he too is putting values on X and on Y,
values that will often be different from the ones the law puts on them. But it
is hard to have something be exchanged at one price in one context and at
another price in another context. The coexistence of two such prices is apt to
give rise to a tension that on occasion results in cycling.
This has bearing on the fairness-versus-welfare debate recently sparked
by Kaplow and Shavell's new book. It shows that the Pareto principle, our
most uncontroversial measure of welfare and the economist's term for free
dom of contract, sometimes has to yield to fairness for reasons which,
though quite different from the familiar ones, are nevertheless not in the
least recondite but rather command universal assent.

